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This thesis examines the writings of Robert Nozick, G. A. Cohen, and Karl Marx 
on capitalism, justice, and human autonomy, especially in connection with the 
conceptualization of capitalism, exploitation, equality, human autonomy, consciousness, 
self-realization, self-actualization, and justice. 
According to Nozick, capitalism is the freest and most just society because he 
believes it respects the individual rights based on self-ownership, the view that people 
own themselves and they own whatever they produce. Cohen, on the other hand, believes 
that Nozick’s theory is not compatible with any notion of equality and autonomy, and 
thus, lacks any commitment to a just society. For him, Nozick tries to justify the 
inequalities that emerge under a regime based on private property. Also, Cohen thinks 
that there are close affinities between Marx’s critique of capitalism and the libertarian 
challenge to egalitarianism, in that, both are based on the concept of self-ownership. 
According to Cohen, because Marx’s critique of capitalism is based on moral grounds as 
an unjust and exploitative social system, his concept of exploitation and the labor theory 
value are unnecessary or irrelevant for the moral claim that labor is exploited under 
capitalism. The moral argument has little to do with the extraction of surplus labor as 
such, but rather with social, distributive injustice. 
Against this argument advanced by Cohen, this study juxtaposes Marx’s notion of 
exploitation as a characteristic of all class societies, in general, and capitalist exploitation 




from Marx’s own critique based on the notion that capitalism undermines human 
autonomy forming a barrier to real human freedom based on a life of consciousness, self-
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“Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto…”1 
Even though the end of Marxism was declared long ago by many, the specter of 
Karl Marx (1818-1883) still haunts the world today. The enduring appeal of Marx’s 
writings rests on its thorough, detailed analysis and critique of capitalism. For some, D. 
Allen (1981), G. Young (1981), A. Buchanan (1981), Z. Husami (1980) and G. A. Cohen 
(1995), Marx’s view of capitalism is that of an exploitative and unjust social system, 
which raises the issue of whether there should be, or even could be, a Marxist theory of 
justice and morality. If a Marxist theory of justice is articulated, what sort of a moral 
theory should it be based on? Conversely, others like R. Tucker (1965, 1969) and A. 
Wood (1972, 1980), claim that Marx does not condemn capitalism or any other social 
formation for being unjust or any other moral shortcoming, denying the notion that his 
analysis of capitalism has any moral underpinnings. Thus, the question remains whether 
Marx’s analysis and critique of capitalism rests on some moral theory. 
Other writers who probe the normative elements of Marx’s works, such as 
Norman Geras (1985a, 1985b, 1992), Steven Lukes (1985), and Lawrence Wilde (1998), 
argue that there is inconsistency in Marx’s works between his ethical commitment and 
                                               
1
 A famous quote by Publius Terentius Afer (195/185 – 159 BC), better known in English as Terence, in his 
play Heauton Timorumenos (The Self-Tormentor), reads: “I am a man, and nothing that concerns a man do 





his hostility to moral argument. They argue that in some sense Marx thinks that the 
process through which surplus value is produced is just, as each mode of production has 
norms of justice appropriate to it; but they remark that he also condemns capitalism in 
moral terms because in various writings he describes the extraction of surplus value as 
robbing, theft, and stealing from the workers. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the notion of justice implicit in Marx’s writings has 
been a big subject of discussion in the analytical Marxist literature. Especially, a thesis 
developed by G. A. Cohen (1941-2009), a leading analytical Marxist about the normative 
basis of Marx’s conceptualization of capitalism, has been at the center of much debate. In 
his Self-ownership, Freedom, and Equality (SOFE), Cohen argues that Marx condemns 
capitalism on moral grounds because he thinks that capitalism is an unjust and 
exploitative social system. The core of Cohen’s thesis is the claim that Marx 
characterizes the appropriation of surplus value as an act of robbing, theft, etc. However, 
according to Cohen, the relationship between Marx’s critique of capitalism and his 
concept of exploitation and the labor theory value is irrelevant. Cohen believes that they 
are unnecessary to the moral claim that labor is exploited because the central issue is not 
how the extraction of surplus labor takes place, but how it involves social injustice. 
Cohen finds parallels between Marx’s critique of capitalism and the libertarian 
challenge to egalitarianism arguing that his theory of exploitation shares similarities with 
Robert Nozick’s (1938-2002) concept of self-ownership, which explains the inviolability 
of human autonomy in libertarianism. According to Cohen, the notion of self-ownership, 
the view that people own themselves and they own whatever they produce, is implicit in a 





of theft of the worker’s labor time by the capitalist who gets what rightfully belongs to 
the worker (Cohen, 1995, p. 117). Marxism’s reliance on the concept of self-ownership 
is, as he puts it, “latent in the standard Marxist condemnation of exploitation, and it is 
therefore difficult for Marxists to reject libertarianism …” (Cohen, 1995, p. 12). Cohen, 
however, argues that there is an inconsistency in Marx between his adherences to the 
concept of self-ownership and his underlying moral critique. Because the principle of 
self-ownership is antithetical to equality and autonomy and does lead to inequality, 
exploitation and slavery, he holds that Marxists must reject self-ownership. Therefore, 
Cohen claims, Marxism “has failed to distinguish itself (sufficiently thoroughly) … 
[from] libertarianism … who affirms the principle of self-ownership, which occupies a 
prominent place in the ideology of capitalism” (Cohen, 1995, p. 116). Cohen then 
concludes that contemporary Marxists need to become more straightforwardly egalitarian 
in their theory by rethinking about their concept of exploitation and normative ethics in 
order to be consistent. This calls for a substantial revision of the labor theory of value 
(LTV) and a more explicit restatement of the normative critique of capitalist exploitation 
along with the alternative visions of equality and autonomy Marxism upholds. Thus, 
because the Marxist critique of capitalism is beset by incoherence, Cohen argues that 
contemporary Marxists should become more consistently egalitarian and criticize 
capitalism on the grounds of social injustice (Cohen, 1995, pp. 158-9). 
Cohen’s analysis is not, however, the only possible interpretation of Marx’s 
works on exploitation, equality, human autonomy, and justice. In fact, the objective of 
this study is to outline an alternative and arguably more accurate interpretation of Marx 





This thesis consists of five chapters with introductions. Chapter II gives a critical 
overview of Cohen’s interpretation of Marxism. This chapter does not aim to 
chronologically examine the development of Cohen’s socialist ideas and his arguments, 
but examines his approach to equality and freedom, and his critique of Marx’s theory. It 
specifically focuses on Cohen’s political and philosophical shift to analytical Marxism 
and his engagement with political philosophy, especially with Nozick’s Anarchy, State, 
and Utopia (Cohen, 1995, pp. 1-4).  
Chapter III explores Robert Nozick’s libertarian philosophy and his theory of 
justice for three reasons: 1) Nozick defends private property on grounds of justice and 
thinks unfettered capitalism maximizes freedom, so it is the most free and just society, 2) 
his book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (ASU) is considered the central text for all 
contemporary academic discussion of justice and capitalism in liber(al)tarian-ism,2 and 3) 
Cohen claims that there are close affinities between libertarianism and Marxism. The 
present chapter concentrates on Nozick’s famous book, ASU, in which his concepts of 
capitalism, justice and individual rights based on self-ownership are elaborated. For the 
remainder of the chapter, Cohen’s response to the foundations of libertarianism and the 
implications of Nozick’s theory are explored and the principles that make up the 
foundation of the Nozickian theory of justice and property are examined. Also, for a 
detailed analysis of Nozick’s theory of justice, in addition to Cohen’s critique of 
libertarianism, some points, which are important components of Nozick’s concept but 
untouched by Cohen, are explored.  
                                               
2
 I use the term liber(al)tarian because I define the libertarians as a type of classical liberal, distinguished 
from other classical liberals by their extreme positions on morality issues and by their style of political 
theorizing, which is characterized by the principles of abstract individualism. So, the very word libertarian 
is a synonym for market fundamentalist and radical free marketeer liberal. It is worth noting that a 





In attempting to explore Marx’s analysis and critique of capitalism, Chapter IV 
presents a rereading of Marx’s Capital (1972a) to comprehend the characteristics of 
capitalist production and the social character of men’s own labor. The chapter quotes 
frequently and extensively from the works of Marx, which admittedly makes for an 
awkward style of presentation. Yet, that is what is required given that the interpretations 
of Marx’s writings differ widely, especially on the major themes of this study. The labor 
theory of value and Marx’s analysis of the nature of the labor process under capitalism 
are taken in the chapter as the necessary foundations of his critique of capitalism in terms 
of the damage it inflicts on human beings. Marx’s conceptualization of value is an 
expression of the sociality of labor and thus, central to an understanding of his notions of 
human autonomy and development and why he thinks the capitalist mode of production 
impairs and distorts human potential and development (Hunt, 1992, p. 104). Also, before 
discussing Marx’s critique of capitalism, the second part of the chapter explores Marx’s 
writings about justice and morality addressing the question whether Marx condemns 
capitalism on moral grounds. Finally, attention is drawn to Marx’s critique of capitalism 
as a socioeconomic system that undermines human autonomy on the basis of alienation, 
and commodity fetishism. In addition, the writings of Carl Jung and Abraham Maslow 
are briefly discussed to elaborate the concept of totality of man, which is central to 
Marx’s thought. Finally, the last chapter provides a brief comparison of the ideas 
presented in this work. 
In conclusion, this work juxtaposes Marx’s notion of exploitation as a 
characteristic of all class societies, in general, and capitalist exploitation in particular. It 





form of extraction that includes viewing labor power as a commodity while it is a 
technical process which satisfies capital’s needs for surplus labor to move according to its 
own “laws of motion.” It also argues that exploitation is the particular social relations of 
capitalism that give to capital and capitalists control of all labor process. On the other 
hand, this work argues that an exploitation centered critique of capitalism lacks a proper 
understanding of the features of capitalism and that it is “naïve” to think of appropriation 
of surplus value by the capitalist as the defining characteristic of injustice of capitalism. 
Marx’s own critique is based on the notion that capitalism undermines human autonomy, 
forming a barrier to real human freedom based on a life of consciousness, self-realization, 
and self-actualization. In Chapter IV, it is argued that human autonomy, self-realization, 
and self-actualization are critical issues in Marx’s view of capitalism.  
“Nothing human is alien to me”, Terence’s line in his drama The Self-Tormentor, 
is said to be always met with loud applause (Riley, 1909, p. 209), a refutation of 
selfishness and self-interest and a tribute to the social nature of man as epitomized in the 
humanistic view of him. Since today is a picture of the change in the notions which 
underlie the structure of society, the present study is an attempt that tries to examine the 
impact of the existing society on human autonomy, self-realization, self-actualization, 
individuality, and sociality. It is part of an ongoing effort to understand how sociality, 
individuality, and the unity of different aspects of man, under existing society, have been 
broken into separate entities, how man became not self-determining but a victim of 





individual. Therefore, at the entrance to the present study, the demand is: “Here must all 
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G. A. COHEN’S EGALITARIAN ANALYTICAL MARXISM,                   
CAPITALISM, AND JUSTICE AND                                                                             
HIS CRITIQUE OF MARXISM 
Introduction 
G. A. Cohen was raised in a family with leftist leanings and with parents who 
were actively involved in the Marxist movement of their time (Cohen, 1995, pp. 245-7).4 
He pursued a career in academia and taught political philosophy for the first part of his 
career. He studied and wrote about dialectic materialism and Karl Marx’s theory of 
history, but spent little time studying any other political philosophies because he believed 
that socialism was self evidently so much more superior than anything else. Cohen’s 
research interests began to shift to political philosophy and the concepts of justice and 
capitalism after he read Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Cohen, 1995, pp. 1-
4). 
The following first explores the shift in Cohen’s political and philosophical views, 
and then investigates his critique of Marxism for its reliance, in his view, on the notion of 
self-ownership, which, he believes, is not compatible with any commitment to justice. 
Cohen asserts that Marx’s critique of capitalism, the theory of exploitation, rests 
implicitly on a normative premise that is also the foundation of libertarianism: self-
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 Cohen was born in Montreal in 1941 and his parents and he were active members of the working class 





ownership: “each person enjoys, over herself and her powers, full and exclusive rights of 
control and use, and therefore owes no service or product to anyone else that she has not 
contracted to supply” (Cohen, 1995, p. 12). In SOFE, in response to Robert Nozick’s 
libertarianism in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Cohen shows that self-ownership and any 
moral commitment to equality and autonomy cannot coexist because self-ownership 
cannot be compatible with equality and autonomy; the point of libertarianism is to 
provide a form of justification for capitalist inequality in libertarianism. However, Cohen 
remarks that after he read Nozick’s book ASU, it caused in him an intellectual crisis, as it 
made him realize that “an appeal to self-ownership is latent in the standard Marxist 
condemnation of exploitation.” He thus, came to the conclusion that “it is difficult for 
Marxists to reject libertarianism” (Cohen, 1995, p. 12). Since self-ownership does lead to 
inequality, exploitation and slavery, Cohen argues that Marx’s concept of exploitation is 
incoherent because it is based on this very concept (Cohen, 1995, pp. 158-9). Cohen 
therefore subscribes to Egalitarian Analytical Marxism in contradiction to traditional 
Marxism which, he holds, has little to say about what justice is. Therefore, he is 
interested in the political philosophy of justice, equality, and exploitation rather than the 
extraction of surplus value (Cohen, 1995, p. 3). 
G. A. Cohen’s Egalitarian Analytical Marxism 
At the beginning of Chapter VI of his book Self-ownership, Freedom, and 
Equality, Cohen describes himself as a member of a school of analytical Marxism whose 
members are “concerned with exactly what a commitment to equality requires, and with 
exactly what sort of obligations productive and talented people have to people who are 





he declares that analytical Marxists “seek a precise definition of what exploitation is, and 
… [they] want to know exactly why it is wrong” (Cohen, 1995, p. 144). 
In his Karl Marx’s Theory of History (2000),5 Cohen explains his departure from 
Marxism at a theoretical level. He says that he dispensed with traditional Marxism 
because he does not think that “Marxism possesses a distinctive and valuable method” 
(Cohen, 2000, p. xxii). According to him, the dialectical method of traditional Marxism 
lacks clear meaning in comparison to his logical and linguistic techniques that can 
“explain molar phenomena by reference to micro-constituents and micro-mechanisms” 
(Cohen, 2000, p. xxiii). And, Cohen adds, “a micro-analysis is always desirable and 
always in principle possible, even if it is not always possible to achieve one in practice at 
a given stage of development of a particular discipline” (Cohen, 2000, p. xxiii). In Jon 
Elster’s view, Cohen has “changed the standards of rigor and clarity that were required to 
write on Marx and Marxism” (Elster, 1985 p. xiv). Another Analytical Marxist John E. 
Roemer, labels it “l'école du marxisme analytique” as a sophisticated version of Marxism 
which exercises “contemporary tools of logic, mathematics and model building” in 
portraying “a non-dogmatic approach to Marxism” (Roemer, 1986, pp. 1-2). This “non-
dogmatic approach to Marxism,” or “Nonbullshit Marxism” (Cohen, 1995, p. ix; Cohen, 
2000, p. xxv) employs rational choice theory and methodological individualism as the 
standard and necessary ingredients to make Analytical Marxism more scientific and 
                                               
5
 The first edition of Cohen’s Karl Marx’s Theory of History published in 1978. It is a core original work of 
Analytical Marxism and established Cohen as a leading Marxist in the 1980s. The 2000 edition of it is 
expanded and includes an introduction on analytical Marxism. In this book Cohen sets out the defense of 
historical materialism, on the grounds of technological determinism, in which he interprets history as 
fundamentally the growth of human productive power, and forms of society rise and fall accordingly as 
they enable or impede that growth (Cohen, 2000, p. x). His History, Labor, and Freedom revealed a shift 






rigorous than traditional Marxism (Hunt, 1992, p. 94; Kumar, 2008, p. 185; Lebowitz, 
1988, p. 199). 
In his work on Marx’s concept of exploitation, Roemer argues that although 
exploitation involves unequal exchange and that is an intrinsic feature of capitalism that 
is unjust, it is an unreliable indicator of its normative objectionability (Roemer, 1985, p. 
31-3). Cohen believes that the upshot of Roemer's argument, like his own, is to force 
Marxists to become more consistently egalitarian, because, he thinks, Marx’s concept of 
exploitation lacks fundamental normative significance for a critique of capitalism as an 
unjust socioeconomic system (Cohen, 1990, p. 382). 
G.A. Cohen argues that Marx’s concept of exploitation rests on self-ownership, 
the view that people own themselves and whatever they produce, a common ground 
between traditional Marxism and libertarianism. According to him, this makes traditional 
Marxism vulnerable to a libertarian challenge to its commitment to the ideal of equality 
for a just society. For Cohen, Marxism has lost most of its factual carapace with respect 
to the value of equality (Cohen, 1995, p. 6). He argues that Marxists are better advised to 
abandon the theory of exploitation and criticize capitalism on the grounds of equality and 
justice. 
G. A. Cohen’s Critique of Marxism, Capitalism, and Justice 
In Self-ownership, Freedom, and Equality, a collection of his articles that 
examines the relationship between concepts of self-ownership, freedom, and equality, 
Cohen argues that Marx holds that the capitalist mode of production is unjustly 
exploitative because the capitalist is guilty of the theft of the worker’s labor time. He 





because the concept’s appeal derives from the labor theory of value and the concept of 
being a self-owner with the ideas of i) not being a slave, ii) possessing autonomy, and iii) 
not being used  merely as a means (Cohen, 1995, p. 230). Therefore, Cohen concludes 
that there is significant common ground between Marxism and libertarianism which 
makes Marxism vulnerable to a libertarian challenge to its commitment to freedom, 
equality, and justice. Cohen accordingly recommends that Marxists should abandon the 
concept of exploitation in their critique of capitalism on the grounds of justice. Then, he 
declares that his purpose is to liberate Marxism from its inconsistencies (Cohen, 1998, p. 
90). 
Cohen argues that Marx relies on the principle of self-ownership because 
according to Marx, capitalism, like all previous class societies, rested on exploitation and 
that means the forcible appropriation of workers’ labor and its product, which he 
characterizes frequently as theft, and robbery. After asking why Marx should use these 
terms unless he believes that the workers’ products are rightfully theirs as an extension of 
themselves and their powers, he concludes that the Marxist position is not distinguished 
from libertarianism. 
For reference purposes, it is worth recording in some detail Cohen’s arguments 
for his claim that Marx’s concept of exploitation is based on the libertarian principle of 
self-ownership and that Marxists have not distanced themselves from the self-ownership 
thesis. Cohen writes: 
Marxists say that capitalists steal labor time from working people. But you can 
steal from someone only that which properly belongs to him. The Marxist critique 
of capitalist injustice therefore implies that the worker is the proper owner of his 
own labor time: he, no one else, has the right to decide what will be done with it. 
But he could hardly have that right without having the right to decide what to do 





… therefore implies that the worker is the proper owner of his own power. But 
Marxists could not think [this] … unless they thought the same is true of people in 
general. Hence the Marxist contention that the capitalist exploits the worker 
depends on the proposition that people are the rightful owners of their own 
powers. That proposition is the thesis of self-ownership, and I claim that it 
undergirds the Marxist case for the proposition that the capitalist relationship is 
inherently exploitative. (Cohen, 1995, p. 146-7) 
 
The traditional Marxist thesis … is that forcible appropriation of another’s labor 
time and product by virtue of ownership of means of production is unjust. … It 
does not matter, for that claim, what sort of capitalist, or what sort of worker, we 
are talking about. (Cohen, 1995, p. 149)  
 
[But] … how could you consider that relationship to be one of unjust exploitation 
without affirming the worker’s self-ownership … if Marxists think (as they 
undoubtedly do) that it is wrong to force a surplus out of the worker, then that 
would be explained by a belief that doing so violates the worker’s rights over his 
own powers. (Cohen, 1995, p. 150)  
 
[Marxists’] uncritical belief that extraction of product from a worker through the 
instrumentality of capital ownership is, as such, unjust. …so, their unreflective 
doctrine of exploitation commits Marxists to an affirmation of the principle of 
self-ownership … Through their [Marxists’] uncompromising line on the 
capital/labor relationship, Marxists come implicitly to accept the notion of self-
ownership, … [which is the foundation of liber(al)tarian-ism and contradicts the 
idea of] equality of benefits and burdens among people. (Cohen, 1995, pp. 150-1) 
  
Cohen is basically saying that the Marxist thesis of exploitation amounts to the 
claim that capitalists steal from workers. He believes that Marx thinks the exploitation is 
unjust because the “transfer of product from the worker to the capitalist involves what 
Marx called “the theft of another person’s labor time” (Cohen, 1995, p. 145). To support 
this claim, Cohen identifies a number of passages where Marx describes the relation 
between capitalist and labor not only as exploitative, but also one involving theft, and 
robbery (Cohen, 1995, pp. 144-64).6 In his view, Marx should be interpreted as implying 
that exploitation is wrong because capitalists unjustly steal labor time from laborer. He 
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 Chapter IV argues that Cohen’s arguments for his critique of Marx’s concept of exploitation relies heavily 
on a very literalistic reading of theft and steal in some of Marx’s writings; rather, it consistently relies on 
French anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865), who sloganeered, “Property is theft” in his 1840 





argues that terms such as theft, robbery, and unequal exchange, strongly suggest that 
Marx sees capitalist exploitation as unjust.7 He adds, however, that if appropriation of 
labor is unjustly exploitative because it violates rights individuals have to their person 
and property, according to this logic, one would need to view state taxation as unjustly 
exploitative as well, even though it supports the disabled and unemployed (Cohen, 1990, 
p. 365). 
Cohen claims that there are three distinct features that “Marxist account of 
exploitation” carries a “redolence of injustice.” He explains these three distinct features 
as follows: a) workers are at the short end of an unequal distribution of means of 
production, b) they are forced to work as others direct them to, c) they are forced to yield 
surplus product to others. Then, he adds that even though the Marxist theory says that (a) 
causes each of (b) and (c), each of these features is an independent statement, and “any 
one of them … [can exist] without the other two, and any two without the third” (Cohen, 
1995, pp. 195-6). Cohen explains one can choose to die, which would make him free 
from means of production, or one can own little means of production but choose to work 
autarchically, so only (a) would be true. Likewise, “if the workers are endowed with 
means of production but forced to work at gunpoint by an oppressor who reaps nothing 
from their labor,” then only (b) would be true. If the oppressor takes some part of what 
they produce by force, then only (c) would be true (Cohen, 1995, p. 196). 
Cohen believes that when confronted with these difficulties, Marxists should give 
up their reliance on self-ownership. However, there is a theoretical price to be paid; for it 
means giving up the traditional account of exploitation that rests on self-ownership. This 
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 This claim has become the ideological touchstone of Analytical Marxist arguments. For example, see 





calls for substantial revision in the labor theory of value (LTV) and the adoption of a 
normative understanding of capitalist exploitation and inequality. 
Cohen asserts in his article The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of 
Exploitation that the LTV and exploitation are mutually irrelevant, and holds that the 
theory of exploitation should be independent of it (Cohen, 1979, p. 338). He adds that the 
LTV is not a suitable basis for the charge of exploitation that Marxists use in their 
critique of capitalism, because Marx’s critique of capitalism is based on a particular 
notion of justice, and his use of the term exploitation denotes a kind injustice (Cohen, 
1979, p. 341). He concludes that the traditional Marxist argument is incomplete because a 
normative basis is not stated (Cohen, 1979, p. 343).  
Cohen summarizes Marx’s writings on the analysis of the capitalist mode of 
production in the following order (Cohen, 1979, pp. 340-2): 1) socially necessary labor 
time determines value. 2) Value determines equilibrium price, which means that 1 and 2 
together entail:  3) socially necessary labor time determines equilibrium price.8 4) Labor, 
and labor, alone creates value. 5) The laborer receives the value of his labor power. 6) 
The value of the product is greater than the value of his labor power. 7) The laborer 
receives less value than he creates. 8) The capitalist receives the remaining value. 9) The 
laborer is exploited by the capitalist. 10) One reason for overthrowing capitalism is that it 
is a regime of exploitation (and exploitation is unjust).9 
Cohen later modifies 4 to show the irrelevance of the LTV for exploitation: “The 
laborer is the only person who creates the product, that which has value” (Cohen, 1979, 
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 Cohen argues that 3 is not true by definition, and says that 3 is falsified. If 3 is falsified, then, 1 and 2 
must be questioned. Then, he concludes that 2 is true by definition, so premise 1 is falsified: it must not be 
the case that socially necessary labor time determines value, for him.   
9





p. 356).10 He argues that Marx confuses the notion that labor alone creates value with the 
distinct idea that labor alone produces what has value. For him, such a small difference in 
phrasing implies an enormous difference of conception (Cohen, 1988, p. 238).  He thinks 
that the value of a product can be determined by many factors other than labor. 
According to him, the idea that labor is the sole creator of what has value is the 
foundation of the charge that capitalism is a system of exploitation. Cohen concludes that 
what explains the difference between the value the laborer produces and the value he 
receives matters little, because it is irrelevant and unnecessary to the moral claim 
Marxists make when they say that capitalism is exploitative. “What matters is just that 
there is that difference” (Cohen, 1979, p. 344). Therefore, for Cohen, the LTV is 
unnecessary to the moral claim that labor is being exploited; it is just a visible 
manifestation of the Marxists’ ideological position (Cohen, 1979, p. 345; Cohen, 1995, p. 
174). 
In Chapter VII of his book SOFE, titled Marx and Locke on Land and Labor, 
Cohen says that Marx means “that capital came into being when and because exploitable 
labor did, as a consequence of the resource dispossession of precapitalist peasants” when 
he writes, “The expropriation of the … peasant from the soil was the basis of the whole 
process” (Cohen, 1995, p. 168). Given that, “according to Marx, it was a critical loss of 
natural resources that generated the proletariat” (Cohen, 1995, p. 168). Cohen then asks 
why, “if lack of land brought the proletariat into being,” what they now lack is not raw 
resources but the means of production (Cohen, 1995, p. 168). For Cohen, it is apparent 
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 This means anything can create value. For example, according to Cohen, a desire or monopolistic control 
of production can create value even though they are nonlabor resources. However, for him, they can even 
enable capitalists to exploit workers. In Cohen’s point of view, this reality is ignored by Marx(ists) because 





that “the land endowment of the whole planet” is crucial to understand the creation of 
proletariat. 
In the end, Cohen concludes that if “Marxist explanation of each proletarian 
generation’s lack of means of production we arrive at an original loss of natural resources 
as the ultimate cause of the exploitability of today’s proletariat” there is a serious 
fundamental disagreement “between the extreme importance imputed to the distribution 
of worldly resources in the Marxist diagnosis of the root cause of exploitation, and the 
total unimportance of worldly resources in the Marxist account of the source of value,” 
which treats labor as “the only source of value … something like a labor theory of value 
is made to serve by John Locke” (Cohen, 1995, p. 169). Then, Cohen says that Marxists 
should “sustain their egalitarianism” because “currently existing inequality descends 
from people’s exercise of their self-owned powers and subsequent disposal of what they 
created by using them” (Cohen, 1995, p. 176). He recommends that Marxists “must 
distinguish their position from a Locke-like one which asserts both the preeminent place 
of labor in value creation and the laborer’s right to his labor and hence to its products” 
(Cohen, 1995, p. 170). He declares that if Marxists want to resolve this dilemma the first 
thing they need to do is to “reduce significance of labor in the account of value creation 
… [which] means giving up the labor theory of value … the other… way is to deny the 
labor’s claim to his product … deny the principle of self-ownership” (Cohen, 1995, p. 
170). 
Next, it is worth discussing Cohen’s ideas about equality, justice, and Marx’s 





distribution under communism”11 contradicts the notion of self-ownership, the principle, 
at the same time, supports it because of its sovereignty aspect over persons. Hence, in his 
view, Marxists are again inconsistent in their arguments (Cohen, 1995, pp. 158-9). Cohen 
explains the origin of the inconsistency by conjuring up an imaginary play, a puppet 
show, which goes as follows: 
The communism objection: The communist principle contradicts the thesis of 
self-ownership, which therefore cannot be attributed to Marxists. 
 
Cohen’s first answer: If the communist principle contradicts the self-ownership 
thesis, then perhaps Marxists contradict themselves. 
 
Objector’s reply: They do not contradict themselves, since they invoke self-
ownership only in an ‘ad hominem’ way. 
 
Cohen’s first rejoinder: They nevertheless ceaselessly employ it, and that might 
be enough to explain their vulnerability to libertarianism. 
 
Cohen’s second rejoinder: The ‘ad hominem’ gambit does not work. 
 
Cohen’s third rejoinder: Merely ad hominem use of the self-ownership thesis 
would not explain the passion which accompanies the Marxist claim that the 
worker is robbed. 
 
Cohen’s second answer to the communism objection: The communist principle 
does not, in fact, contradict the self-ownership thesis (Cohen, 1995, p. 158). 
 
Also, Cohen believes that Marxists have traditionally shown little interest in 
equality because they believe in the inevitability of abundance. He claims that the 
precept, “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs,” relies on a 
conviction that industrial development will bring society to a condition of abundance that 
will make it possible to meet what everyone needs (Cohen, 1995, p. 10).12 And he 
concludes that he cannot maintain “Marx’s extravagant, pregreen, materialist optimism” 
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 He refers to, “from each according to his ability, to each according to his need.”  
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 Similarly, Allen Wood asserts that the principle is not an egalitarian slogan. For Wood, the principle 





(Cohen, 1995, p. 10). Cohen asserts that the materialist optimism of the future abundance 
is not an acceptable conceptualization for equality and justice. He calls this 
conceptualization Marxist technological fix and argues that this consideration has served 
as a means of avoiding the question of justice, which cannot be neglected. 
Additionally, Cohen contends that Marx’s lower phase of communism preserves 
the principle of self-ownership and the socialist proportionality principle condones 
inequality: “the more talented will … do better than less talented” (Cohen, 1995, p. 124). 
Cohen claims that waiting for centuries for the Marxist technological fix to supplant 
liber(al)tarian principle of self-ownership, and overcome inequality it is not “realistic to 
think about the material situation of humanity” and not acceptable for an egalitarian 
position of justice (Cohen, 1995, pp. 124-7).13 
Finally, Cohen recommends that Marxists should become more straightforwardly 
egalitarian in their theory by rethinking their concept and normative ethics in order to be 
consistent. For him, the principal concern should be defending a thoroughgoing 
egalitarian distribution of income and eliminating the stated inconsistency. Also, 
according to Cohen, contemporary Marxists should follow John Bordley Rawls (1921-
2002)14 and Ronald Myles Dworkin (1931-…)15 who reject the libertarian premises of 
self-ownership and see individuals’ abilities as largely the result of good fortune, rather 
than something for which they are fully responsible. For Cohen, this is the best hope for 
supporting an egalitarian outlook, and this is the consistent way of criticizing capitalism 
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 Cohen writes, “Marx had to believe either that capitalism would last forever or that such a development 
of the productive forces would one day come. And, since he [Marx] hated capitalism, he needed his 
technological fix” (Cohen, 1995, p. 132).   
14
 John B. Rawls was an American philosopher in moral and political philosophy and is the author of the 
famous, A Theory of Justice. 
15





(Cohen, 1995, pp. 160-1). Cohen says that rejecting the principle of self-ownership does 
not mean that no self-ownership rights are affirmed at all. Rejecting the principle of self-
ownership is consistent with affirming many self-ownership rights that do not contradict 
equality and autonomy (Cohen, 1995, p. 119).16 Cohen thinks that the only way to block 
exploitation is to constrain individuals in the exercise of their talent and labor, which, in 
his view, is morally permissible to reach an egalitarian society. In order to support his 
arguments, Cohen gives an example involving a hypothetical situation of a two-people 
world,17 which is a model of abstractly pictured individuals with given interests, wants, 
purposes, needs etc., that show that equality can only be reached at the expense human 
autonomy. 
Concluding Remarks 
Cohen is right when he says that Locke’s labor mixture is a “premise to justify the 
original formation of private property” (Cohen, 1995, p. 176). However, some 
clarification is needed to question the relationship between Marx and Locke or a Locke-
like conception by showing how Marx approaches them. It is unquestionable that John 
Locke had a profound effect on the development of economic thought and the founders of 
classical economics.18 It is also clear in Marx writings that he was aware of Locke’s 
significant place in the development of the liberal political economy. Hence, Marx 
recognizes Locke as the prophet of capitalist appropriation and private property who laid 
the theoretical foundation of bourgeois political economy: “Locke’s view is all the more 
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 The grounds of this claim are explored in Chapter III in which Robert Nozick’s libertarian philosophy 
and Cohen’s critique of self-ownership are discussed.   
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 Chapter III discusses Cohen’s hypothetical model in detail. 
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 Evald Ilyenkov’s book Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Marx’s Capital (1982) is a good 
source to see how Locke’s ideas shaped the writings of the first theoreticians of political economy such as 





important because it was the classical expression of bourgeois society’s ideas of rights as 
against feudal society, and moreover his philosophy served as the basis for all the ideas of 
the whole of subsequent English political economy” (Marx, 1969, p. 367). What Marx is 
trying to show in the lines above is the importance of Locke’s theory in a bourgeois 
political economy. This does not necessarily mean that a Locke-like view has an impact 
on Marx’s value theory. On the contrary, it will become clear that Locke’s labor mixture 
pales in comparison with that of Marx and one would emphatically deny such an 
ascription to his works when Marx’s analysis of capitalism is argued. 
Also, contrary to Cohen’s discussion, the importance of worldly resources, as a 
constituent element in human practice, is obvious in a number of the lines in Marx’ 
writings. For example, when Marx takes notes to the The Programme of the German 
Worker’s Party in the Critique of Gotha Program, his first comment on the first article of 
the programme, “Labor is the source of all wealth and all culture,” not only presents a 
critique of the fetish character of the leftist social democrat perception of labor, but also 
introduces the historical relationship between labor and nature. In Marx’s own words, 
“Labor is not the source of all wealth. Nature is just as much the source of use values … 
as labor, which itself is only the manifestation of a force of nature, human labor power” 
(Marx, 1936, pp. 554-5). The perception of production by isolated labor or nature is an 
inherently illogical and ahistorical account. According to Marx, man and nature compose 
an essential unity. In Marx’s own words, “the worker can create nothing without nature” 
(Marx, 1986, p. 109).19 On the other hand, “nature … taken abstractly, for itself, and 
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 One of the most important aspects of the relationship between man and nature, which is considered by 
Marx as a part of the labor’s fourfold alienation under capitalism, is labor’s estrangement from nature. 





fixed in its separation from man, is nothing for man” (Marx, 1986, p. 191). And nature as 
a use value is realized only through the transformative power of labor. The labor 
represented in this transformation, in the commodity is the abstract labor that creates 
value as a social category and alienated form.20 Therefore, Cohen’s claim can be 
interpreted as an unfortunate misunderstanding of the differences between the exchange 
value and use value, and abstract labor and concrete labor, and value, market price, and 
equilibrium price. 
The claim, which is based on the importance of the land endowment of the whole 
planet, can be correctly concluded by referring to the chapter, The Secret of Primitive 
Accumulation in Marx’s Capital (1972a) to show historical origins of the creation and 
appropriation of surplus value as a source of primitive accumulation and capital 
accumulation. The chapter begins with a summary of the Chapters One through Twenty 
five of Capital (1972a): “We have seen how money is changed into capital; how through 
capital surplus value is made, and from surplus value more capital.” Marx continues, “… 
the accumulation of capital presupposes surplus value; surplus value presupposes 
capitalistic production; capitalistic production presupposes the preexistence of 
considerable masses of capital and labor power in the hands of producers of 
commodities,” who are the owners of money and means of production, and the seller of 
their own labor power (Marx, 1972a, p. 713) So, capitalist production also presupposes 
the separation of the workers from the means of production and the concentration of the 
                                                                                                                                            
reduced to a mere means of subsistence. See Marx: Estranged Labor and Polanyi: Market and Man and 
Market and Nature for a detailed analysis (Marx, 1986, pp. 106-19; Polanyi, 2001, pp. 171-200).       
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 Put another way, concrete labor is reduced to abstract labor through the market and thus, has a social 
character. “Abstract labor (that has been rendered social through the sale and purchase of commodity” is 
the “substance or essence of value” (Hunt, 2002, p. 226).  This is why, when Marx talks about the 
relationship between labor and value he always uses abstract labor. It is the abstract labor that creates 





means of production in the hands of a few, the capitalists. Free workers are not part of the 
means of production themselves; hence, they are distinguished from serfs. 
Therefore, there is a complete separation of the workers from the means of 
production for the realization of the labor. Marx explains that the preceding capitalistic 
accumulation, the original sin that is responsible for the poverty of the great majority, and 
for the sanctity of private property, has originated in “conquest, enslavement, robbery, 
murder, briefly force, [which] play the great part” (Marx, 1972a, p. 714). That is why the 
actual history is notorious.  And Marx writes, “from this original sin dates the poverty of 
the great majority that, despite all its labor, has up to now nothing to sell but itself, and 
the wealth of the few that increases constantly although they have long ceased to work” 
(Marx, 1972a, p. 713). Then, Marx concludes, “The socalled primitive accumulation, 
therefore, is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the 
means of production” (Marx, 1972a, 714). This separation between labor and means of 
production is a continuous and inherent process of capitalist production. It will be seen in 
detail in the section on the critique of Robert Nozick in Chapter III that “the original loss 
of natural resources,” or the origin of primitive accumulation means nothing else than the 
separation of producers from the means of production. And it is argued that it is this 
separation that created historical and current sui generis conditions of the production and 
extraction of surplus value as the fundamental underpinning of Marx’s commodified 
alienated labor under capitalism; hence, the future society demands to abolish this 
separation. 
It is discussed in some detail in Chapter IV but it is worth noting that, for Marx, 





from its bearer, human being, and become a thing; a thing that has been estranged from 
the nature, product of his labor, from his species being, and from himself (Marx, 1986, 
pp. 112-4). It is palpable after this separation that slavery, barbarism, battle, murder, 
robbery, theft, cruelty, savagery, poverty, hunger, racism, discrimination, sexism, 
violation of human rights, the suppression of national self-determination, oppression, the 
exploitation of the Third World, in brief, all types of inequalities, which are inherent in 
private property regime, have been taking place in every aspect of life. If Marx fell under 
the historically wide diversity of inequality’s spell, his concept would stand below class 
antagonisms and below any recollection of them, and at the end, all his analysis would 
arrive at the original sin just as in theology do the others: “Adam bit the apple, and 
thereupon sin fell on the human race” (Marx, 1972a, p. 713). 
It is argued that Marx’s analysis of capitalist production and appropriation of 
surplus value are based on two premises that are the content of the labor theory of value: 
firstly, Marx states that there is a difference between labor and labor power; secondly, he 
shows that the surplus value that labor creates is the source of profit. The purpose of the 
LTV is to uncover the social relation between capitalist and worker. Marx’s main purpose 
is to reveal the social relations between capital and labor. Therefore, to reject the labor 
theory of value means to reduce “the critique of capitalism to a matter of one’s feelings 
about the fairness or unfairness of the initial endowments of assets” (Hunt, 1992, p. 103). 
Unsurprisingly, in Why not Socialism, his last book, Cohen reduces the desirability of 
socialism to the rational choice theory, an ethical choice of the alienated individual, even 
though it is not a feasible system for him. In the book, Cohen’s argument for future 





desirable alternative required by justice, and a better system than capitalism even though 
it is impossible to establish it.21  However, also, due to the selfish, self-interested 
behavior of the individual, which capitalism depends on, the inability of the alienated 
individual to change society contradicts the desirability of the future society in Cohen’s 
Why not Socialism. It is questionable how something that is impossible can be desirable. 
Therefore, this study takes the view that the LTV and Marx’s analysis of the 
nature of the labor process under capitalism are the necessary foundations of his critique 
of the damage to human beings, and human autonomy and human development in 
capitalist society. Marx’s conceptualization of value is an expression of the sociality of 
labor, which the capitalist mode of production impairs and distorts (Hunt, 1992, p. 104). 
Also, another interpretation of Marx’s writings on exploitation, especially Capital 
(1972a), emphasizes that it is a technical process that satisfies capital’s ceaseless, 
unending drive to accumulate capital. The particular social relations of capitalism give 
control of all labor process to capital and capitalists (Hunt, 1992, p. 94). An interpretation 
of Marx’s views, which ignores the social relations of capitalism, is hardly consistent 
with Marx’s Capital. Therefore, Cohen’s notion of exploitation has no connection to 
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 In the book Cohen imagines a camping trip among friends and relatives. Everything is shared freely; each 
person contributes according to his ability and obeys the rules of equality and community. After a while, 
campers begin to act selfishly, and demand more according to their talents and contributions. For example, 
one demands extra food because he is good at fishing, another one demands more payment when she finds 
a huge apple tree, “full of perfect apples,” another one demands more payment too, because she realizes 
that she is more talented than the others, another one recognizes that he has a special information about the 
campsite and wants to have better food than the others. At the end, all these selfish motives and interests 
are suppressed by the soul of the camping community. The campers realize that it is obvious, right away to 
organize a camping trip on socialist principles. Cohen concludes that socialism is morally a desirable 
system (Cohen, 2009, pp. 5-11). Then Cohen asks, why can’t society as a whole be ordered the same way? 
The rest of his argument concludes that socialism is desirable but not feasible for society as a whole 
because first, Cohen, a postmodern thinker, says that, it requires a better moral character (capitalism has 
deepened selfish and egocentric interests), and second “… we now know that we do not now know how to 
do that” since in large scale societies it impossible to make good calculations without market prices 
(Cohen, 2009, pp. 53-81). In sum, it will be seen that this technocratic social engineering in a hypothetical 





capitalist relations of production. The gist of Cohen’s account of Marx’s views on 
exploitation is based essentially on a kind of positivist epistemology and logical 
positivism. 
Up to this point Cohen’s claim that the libertarian concept of self-ownership is 
unavoidable in the Marxist account of exploitation has been discussed. It has been seen 
that, according to Cohen as one who made his primary commitment to equality, 
capitalism is an unjust socioeconomic system because it deprives people of their rightful 
share of world resources and frustrates the satisfaction of fundamental human needs. 
Therefore, capitalism should be discussed on the ground of social injustice, and a moral 
critique should be the central element in contemporary Marxist theory. The next chapter 
explores Robert Nozick’s libertarian philosophy and his theory of justice and analyzes 
Cohen’s claim that self-ownership is the most fundamental argument in favor of 
libertarianism. It also explores those aspects of Nozick’s theory of justice that Cohen’s 




















ROBERT NOZICK’S LIBERTARIAN PHILOSOPHY, CAPITALISM,                    
AND JUSTICE, AND G. A. COHEN’S CRITIQUE OF NOZICK:               
INCOMPATIBILITY OF SELF-OWNERSHIP WITH                                        
EQUALITY AND AUTONOMY 
Introduction 
Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia (ASU) was awarded the National 
Book Award in 1975 and is widely acclaimed as one of the most important contributions 
to political philosophy on freedom and justice in the twentieth century (Bader, 2010, p. 
4).22 For example, B.H. Fried points out that Nozick’s ASU is not “only the central text 
for all contemporary academic discussions of libertarianism; together with John Rawls’ 
(1921-2002) A Theory of Justice (1971), it also arguably framed the landscape of 
academic political philosophy in the last decades of the twentieth century” (Fried, 2005, 
p. 221). Similarly, D. Schmidtz observes “The agenda for current philosophical work on 
justice was set in the 1970s by John Rawls and Robert Nozick” (Schmidtz, 2005, p. 148). 
More importantly, Nozick’s writings are also very much influential in academic debates 
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 Anyone who wishes to gain an adequate understanding of Nozick’s ideas should begin by investigating 
the following questions: Why Anarchy, State, and Utopia, in the U.S.A in the early 1970s? The answer 
would be historically reflexive. This reflexivity addresses the revival of liber(al)tarian diaspora and 
conservative ideas, which enjoyed an enormous resurgence during the second half of the twentieth century. 
Jonathan Wolff correctly observes that: “Nozick’s views have many affinities with the defense of laissez 
faire capitalism which has been part of the ruling ideology of the 1980s” (Wolff, 1991, p. viii). The 






on distributive justice (see Narveson, 1998; Hasnas, 2003, 2005; Van Parijs, 1995; 
Vallentyne, Steiner & Otsuka, 2005; Dworkin, 2003; and Cohen, 1995).  
In his New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, 
Friedrich August Hayek (1899-1992) regards libertarians as “true liberals” (Hayek, 1978, 
p. 298). An explanation of why libertarians became true liberals can be found in the lines 
of Jeffrey Friedman (1997). He says that the studies of Chicago and Austrian school 
economists could not explain why government intervention in the economy would do 
more harm than good and their debates with the socialist economists of the 1920s were 
not beneficial and sufficient for the idea of a free market economy. Friedman thus notes, 
“Nozick became a libertarian after being convinced that [Ludwig von] Mises-Hayek 
critique of socialism was lethal” (Friedman, 1997, p. 450).23 Given that many premises of 
liber(al)tarian arguments are explicitly derived from ASU it is no accident that current 
libertarian arguments of justice are founded upon the Nozickian premises of self-
ownership. 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick’s masterpiece, is primarily a classic 
example of a classical liberal critique of the welfare state for what he calls the violation 
of human liberty as it restricts free market economy, and pure capitalism, which is deified 
as a symbol of human freedom in his theory. Nozick’s critique, a far cry from the classic 
efficiency discussions of liberal theory, rests on his theory of justice which is premised on 
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 Robert Nozick was born in 1938 in Brooklyn, a son of a Russian Jewish immigrant family. He became 
interested in philosophy as an undergraduate at Columbia and completed his PhD in 1963 at Princeton with 
the dissertation, The Normative Theory of Individual Choice. Before attending Princeton Nozick was a 
committed socialist and he had joined Norman Thomas’ Socialist Party (Bader, 2010, pp. 1-3). However, at 
Princeton, he dispensed with his self evident, superior socialist ideas, and was then mesmerized by 
emerging free market fundamentalism and bewitching illusions of capitalism; he started to become a fierce, 
influential-leader, and life-long committed liber(al)tarian. Nozick acquired fame through the publication of 
his book Anarchy, State, and Utopia in 1974 when he was a professor at Harvard. In this book, Nozick 
peaks his libertarian political and moral theory by defending an extreme form of individualism based on 





the principle of self-ownership, which claims that an individual possesses ownership over 
himself, and because of this he is inviolable. For Nozick, if one owns himself, then he 
owns whatever he produces (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 105). According to Nozick, self-
ownership is based on the assertion that, “Individuals have rights, and there are things no 
person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)” (Nozick, 1974, p. ix). 
The very idea of these rights constitutes the basis of Nozick’s theory and property. 
Hence, Nozick sees the defense of private property as essential to a free life under 
capitalism. 
For Nozick, only a “minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection 
against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified” because “any 
more extensive state will violate person’s rights not to be forced to do certain things” 
(Nozick, 1974, p. ix). In other words, the minimal state is basically the night watchman 
state of classical liberalism whose functions are the same as stated above. Nozick’s 
theory does not defend private property on utilitarian grounds. He believes that the free 
market economy brings better goods at lower prices, and thus, more prosperity to more 
people by increasing economic efficiency, etc. But these are not the reasons why he 
defends the right to property and free market economy. Nozick defends the right to 
private property on moral grounds. His libertarianism holds that the right to private 
property is an absolute fundamental right. 
Since Nozick thinks his moral principles are borrowed from Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804) and John Locke (1632-1704), this chapter focuses on his theory of justice 
with special references to Kantian principle, Lockean proviso, and his Entitlement Theory 





chapter, Cohen’s response to the foundations of libertarianism and the implications of 
Nozick’s theory are explored and the principles that make up the foundation of the 
Nozickian theory of property are examined. In addition, since Cohen’s account does not 
address the origins of Nozick’s theory, the rest of the section focuses on these aspects of 
Nozick’s philosophy Cohen does not discuss. 
Nozick’s Libertarian Philosophy, Capitalism, and Justice 
Nozick’s Theory of Rights 
The heart of Nozick’s theory as stated in the first sentence of Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia, holds that “individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may 
do to them (without violating these rights)” (Nozick, 1974, p. ix). Nozick’s concept of 
absolute individual rights is founded upon the principle of self-ownership and moral 
inviolability of individuals. Self-ownership is the free exercise of one’s uniqueness. In 
ASU, Nozick introduces the principle of self-ownership as the first premise of his view of 
morality: “The principle says that every person is morally entitled to full private property 
in his own person and powers. This means that each person has an extensive set of moral 
rights … over the use and fruits of his body and capacities” (Cohen & Graham, 1990, p. 
25). For Nozick, all individuals enjoy full and exclusive rights of control and use over 
themselves and their powers. Therefore, these self-owners owe no service or products to 
anyone else that they have not contracted to supply. Each person is owned by himself and 
so must be free as he pleases, as long as it does not harm anyone else (Otsuka, 2003, pp. 
12-3). 
According to Nozick, these absolute individual rights should command the 





individuals are ends and not merely means; they may not be sacrificed or used for the 
achieving of other ends without their consent” (Nozick, 1974, pp. 30-1). This Kantian 
principle is based on a theory of rights, treats persons as “distinct individuals who are not 
resources for others” (Nozick, 1974, p. 33). In Nozick’s opinion, a liberal society treats 
individuals, not as “instrument or resources,” but as “persons having individual rights 
with the dignity this constitutes” (Nozick, 1974, p. 334). For Nozick, the most important 
rights are rights over oneself, the rights that constitute self-ownership. The term self in 
self-ownership signifies that what owns, and what is owned, are one and the same, 
namely, the whole person (Cohen, 1986, p. 110). To put it another way, if a person owns 
himself, then he owns whatever he produces (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 105). 
Nozick argues that the morality of a “meaningful life” is derived from the natural 
right to self-ownership. In his analysis of a “meaningful life,” Nozick not only takes the 
right to self-ownership as a natural right, but also links it with the right of private 
appropriation. This concept shows that Nozick’s theory of rights is derived from Locke. 
In the Lockean account, the use of the earth to the best advantage of people’s life is what 
links the natural right to self-ownership with the right to private appropriation. In 
Nozick’s theory, only private appropriation fulfils the concept of a meaningful life 
(Papaioannou, 2010, pp. 22-3). The importance of the right to property is such that 
Nozick clearly and unambiguously states the superiority of the right to private property 
over all other rights, even the right to life. He writes, “one first needs a theory of property 
rights before one can apply any supposed right to life. … the right to life cannot provide 
the foundation for a theory of property rights” (Nozick, 1974, p. 179). This 





In Nozick’s theory, men have the right to live separate lives because they are 
“capable of choosing autonomously among alternatives” (Nozick, 1974, p. 48). Nozick 
thinks that there is no need for unreasonable worry, and God should not tell humankind 
what to do with their rights. According to Nozick, a person may choose to do anything 
himself, or have another do it for him, which “may be impossible for him to do himself” 
(Nozick, 1974, p. 58). This capability is founded on three characteristics: “rationality, 
free will, and moral agency” (Nozick, 1974, p. 48). Nozick believes that it is these 
characteristics of which each self consists. And he thus believes that self-ownership is a 
right that people can legitimately claim. He says that a laborer, who lacks any property, 
and must sell his labor power to the capitalist, has the right to self-ownership (Nozick, 
1974, pp. 262-4). He has the right to self-ownership even though Nozick concedes he 
may be forced to agree to whatever terms the capitalist is offering him in order to survive, 
which can be the equivalent to slavery in ancient Rome. The sovereignty over owning 
vastly unequal amounts of wealth cannot be questioned because they are the inevitable 
and natural result of the properly exercised principle of self-ownership. Hence, any 
attempt to reduce inequality at the expense of private property is an unacceptable 
violation of justice. If this right is violated by removing someone’s private property the 
result is like removing his arm (Nozick, 1974, p. 206). 
The central claim in Nozick’s theory is that everyone is entitled to the goods they 
currently possess, and a just distribution is simply whatever distribution results from 
people’s free exchanges. Any distribution that arises through free transfers from a just 
situation is itself just. For the government to coercively tax these exchanges against 





work. The only legitimate taxation is to raise revenues for maintaining the background 
institutions needed to protect the system of free exchange (Nozick, 1974, p. 151). 
Therefore, Nozick thinks that only unrestricted private property rights, freewheeling 
capitalism can fully recognize the right to self-ownership (Nozick, 1974, p. 186). 
Nozick’s argument can be summarized in two claims: a) only unrestricted 
capitalism recognizes self-ownership and thus, any intervention in market exchange is 
incompatible with it, and b) equality rests on recognizing individuals as self-owners. The 
following section elaborates on Nozick’s theory of the state to clarify why he maintains 
that a free market economy is indispensable for a just society, one that recognizes man’s 
absolute individual rights. 
Nozick’s Theory of Minimal State for Justice 
Nozick proposes a moral justification of the minimal state in terms of abstract 
principles of libertarianism, arguing for a free market and unrestricted private property 
rights. The central claim in Nozick’s libertarianism is that redistributive taxation is 
inherently unjust; it is a violation of people’s rights, so an obstruction of justice. Nozick 
thinks that the spontaneous and evolutionary process of free market exchange can grant 
libertarian values. People have a right to freely dispose of their goods and services, 
whether or not it is the best way to ensure productivity. 
Put another way, government has no right to interfere in the market.  As Nozick 
puts it, “a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, 
fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; any more extensive state will 
violate persons’ rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified” (Nozick, 





interference is a violation, not of efficiency, but of their suigeneris moral rights for 
justice, the right to self-ownership. Hence, there is no argument for public education, 
public health care, transportation, roads, or parks. All of these involve the coercive 
taxation of some people against their will, violating the principle of “from each as they 
choose, to each as they are chosen” (Nozick, 1974, p. 160). In general, in Nozick’s view, 
a distributive state violates the rights of all individuals to equal freedom of choice 
(Nozick, 1974, pp. 149-50). In particular, in this view, the state violates individuals’ right 
to property if it attempts to transfer property from the rich to the poor. Distribution is to 
be left to the unimpeded free market, gifts, and voluntary charitable donations (Nozick, 
1974, p. 164). 
Therefore, according to Nozick, taxation involves taking the product of one’s 
labor. Taking the income of n hours of work from a person amounts to taking n hours 
from that person. It is like forcing the person to work n hours for a purpose he has not 
chosen. To give persons an enforceable claim on the product of the labor of other persons 
amounts to giving persons partial ownership in other persons. This contravenes the 
principle of self-ownership; it violates the right to self-ownership because it gives persons 
a claim on the labor of other persons (Nozick, 1974, p. 172). By extension, redistribution 
per se violates the rights of individuals. Taxation, a form of redistribution, involves 
taking from some what they are entitled to and giving it to others. Nozick denounces it as 
on par with forced labor. For Nozick, talk of redistributing the wealth means talk of 
redistributing the body parts of persons (Nozick, 1974, p. 206). 
Some argue that libertarianism is not a theory of equality or mutual advantage. 





unrestricted market economy involves more freedom; freedom is the fundamental value 
and, therefore, the free self-regulated market economy is morally required. That is why 
Nozick believes that the market respects individual freedom (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 138). 
Since Nozick thinks laissez faire capitalism is the most just society because the 
buyers and sellers are the freest in free exchange, he rejects socialism without giving any 
definition of it. He argues that any attempt of redistribution of wealth in society can be 
maintained only at the price of tyranny and injustice. Nozick assumes that freedom will 
inevitably be upset under socialism as soon as the socialist state intervenes in economic 
life even if private property over means of production is respected (Nozick, 1974, p. 163). 
Put in Nozick’s words: “The socialist society would have to forbid capitalist acts between 
consenting adults” (Nozick, 1974, p. 163).  
Also, Nozick, in his judgment of the socialist state and Marxism, criticizes Marx’s 
concept of exploitation. Even though he never explains why he argues that with the 
collapse of the labor theory of value, the Marxist theory of exploitation collapses too,24 he 
writes, “the charm and simplicity of this theory’s definition of exploitation is lost when it 
is realized that according to the definition there will be exploitation in any society in 
which investments take place for a greater future (perhaps because of population growth); 
and in any society in which those unable to work, or to work productively, are subsidized 
by the labor of others” (Nozick, 1974, p. 253). 
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The Nozickian Proviso25 
Nozick remarks that his moral assumptions are borrowed from Locke and Kant. 
Locke writes in the Treatise of Civil Government: 
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man 
has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself. The 
labor of his body and the work of his hands we may say are properly his. 
Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it 
in, he hath mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and 
thereby makes it his property … that excludes the common right of other men: for 
this labor being the unquestionable property of the laborer, no man but he can 
have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as 
good, left in common for others. (Locke, 1937, p. 18)  
 
Locke suggests that one can acquire property rights over their products by mixing 
their labor with resources if one leaves “enough and as good” for others. In addition, 
Locke insists that there should be no waste; no one has a right to appropriate more than 
he can use before it spoils; “the world is a common stock from which we are at liberty to 
draw the means of our self-preservation” (Kelly, 2007, p. 68). 
While Locke’s proviso means that there be “enough and as good left in common 
for others,” in Nozick’s view this is meant to ensure that others are not made worse off by 
the appropriation in question (Nozick, 1974, p. 176).26 In this way, the unowned 
recourses come to be appropriated by self-owning individuals. Nozick argues that those 
who are unable to appropriate are not made worse off by a private property regime that 
allows appropriation and permanent ownership, but, rather, in many cases, actually made 
better off. Nozick thinks that Locke provides the proper definition of legitimate 
appropriation: one that does not worsen anyone’s overall condition. Nozick calls this the 
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 Nozick’s interpretation of Locke’s view is called Nozickian Proviso (Papaioannu, 2010). 
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 Nozick criticizes Locke’s labor mixture notion and writes of “… why isn’t mixing what I own with what 
I don’t own a way of losing what I own rather than a way of gaining what I don’t? If I own a can of tomato 
juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules (made radioactive, so I can check this) mingle evenly 





Lockean Proviso, and adopts it as his test of legitimate acquisition: “a process morally 
giving rise to a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing will 
not do so if the position of others no longer at liberty to use the things is thereby 
worsened” (Nozick, 1974, p. 178).27 Also, Nozick believes that “the free operation of a 
market system will not actually run afoul of the Lockean proviso” (Nozick, 1974, p. 182). 
In Nozick’s opinion, appropriation and exchange always result in compensating benefits 
so that: “private property satisfies the intent behind the ‘enough and as good left over’ 
proviso” (Nozick, 1974, p. 177). 
For Nozick, the ideas of Locke are compatible with the Kantian principle that 
“individuals are ends and not merely means, they are not to be sacrificed or used for the 
achieving of other’s ends without their consent. Individuals are inviolable” (Nozick, 
1974, p. 31). These principles are the foundation of Nozick’s theory of justice and his 
defense of the right to private property. More specifically, Nozick places these principles 
with the Lockean proviso at the heart of his Entitlement Theory of Justice, which is 
explained in the following section. 
Nozick’s Entitlement Theory of Justice 
Nozick refers to his theory of property rights as the Entitlement Theory of Justice 
in holdings. The Entitlement Theory of Justice (ENTOJ) backs up the argument of the 
minimal state and the belief in the free market. The ENTOJ has three aspects: a) the 
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 Nozick adds that if appropriation fails to do so, it must compensate others. However, his argument of 
compensation is not clear at all. To compensate someone is not to give him what he would have had, given 
the opportunity to appropriate the thing in question, but only to give him what he would have had, had he 
had the opportunity to use the thing in question. It means, for the principle, the community owes nothing to 
whoever is unable to work because they “deserved to be punished, and deserved to have a lower share” 
(Nozick, 1974, pp. 154, 178). In order to justify his concept he arbitrarily narrows the base line and says, 
“the crucial point is whether appropriation on an unowned object worsens the situation of others” (Nozick, 





“principle of justice in acquisition” that stipulates the justice of original acquisition or the 
appropriation of unheld things, b) the “principle of justice in transfer” that stipulates the 
transfer of holdings from one person to another, and c) “the principle of rectification of 
justice in holdings” intended to rectify violations of the first two principles (Nozick, 
1974, pp. 151-2). According to ENTOJ, a distribution is just if it is the result of the just 
application of the first two principles. Nozick contends that his theory differs from other 
theories of distributive justice because it is historical. He writes:  
I do not know of a thorough or theoretically sophisticated treatment of such 
issues. … [However] this principle uses historical information about previous 
situations and injustices done in them, and information about the actual course of 
events that flowed from these injustices, until the present, and it yields a 
description of holdings in the society. (Nozick, 1974, p. 152) 
 
In Nozick’s theory, the principle of justice in transfers assumes that the earlier 
owner had a legitimate title. The validity of property rights depends on the validity of the 
previous property rights. Then, determining the validity of current property rights 
requires going back down the chain of transfers to the beginning (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 
111). 
Nozick says that the principle of original acquisition is concerned with the 
appropriation of unheld things, while the principle of justice in transfer is concerned with 
the process through which justly held things can be transferred to other persons. These 
two principles assume that persons are self-owners. In Nozick’s theory, each individual is 
justified in appropriating the world resources and transferring them in a way he chooses 
so long as his choice does not worsen the situation of others. The application of the 
principle of rectification presupposes that the minimal state has already emerged as an 





first two principles of entitlement justice. Nozick briefly summarizes his ENTOJ: 
“Whatever arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just” (Nozick, 1974, p. 151). 
The remainder of this chapter examines the implications of the key components of 
Nozick’s theory of justice and freedom by questioning their consequences and logical 
conclusions. It first addresses Cohen’s claim that Nozick self-ownership and his moral 
commitment to equality and autonomy are inconsistent, and then focuses on a further 
critique of libertarianism by questioning the origins and the foundations of Nozick’s 
theory of justice. 
A Critique of Robert Nozick’s Libertarian Philosophy of Justice 
Introduction 
G. A. Cohen, in Self-ownership, Freedom and Equality, responds to Robert 
Nozick’s libertarianism, but does so by adopting Nozick’s idea of self-ownership.28 
Cohen is attracted to the libertarian idea of self-ownership and attempts to find a way in 
which it can be reconciled with his moral commitments to equality and autonomy, which, 
he holds, underpin a just society. The following section discusses Cohen’s effort to 
reconcile these principles. Cohen’s account, however, does not question the abstract 
individualism Nozick uses to justify private property, its origins, and the emergence of 
free market economy, and thus, does not go far enough. Expanding on what is left out in 
Cohen’s critique, the chapter ends with a broader critique of Nozick’s philosophy. 
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A Critique of Nozick’s Theory of Justice by Cohen: Incompatibility of                        
Self-ownership with Equality and Autonomy 
Cohen focuses his criticism on two aspects of distributive justice: a person’s 
relationship to himself and his relationship to material resources that is usually framed in 
terms of what rights people have (Cohen, 1995, p. 71). Rights describe the powers people 
have in relation to themselves and others. Hence, Cohen examines what rights people 
should have over themselves and over material resources. 
On what rights people have over themselves, Nozick claims that a person should 
have liberty to act according to one’s free will. Nozick argues that the way to ensure 
liberty is to consider people as self-owners (Cohen, 1995, p. 71). However, Cohen points 
out that Nozick gives no independent argument that freedom is the ultimate primary 
value from which self-ownership is derived. Cohen argues, “Nozick’s real view is that 
the scope and nature of the freedom that we should enjoy is a function of our self-
ownership” (Cohen, 1995, p. 67). This means that, according to Nozick, a person is free 
if he is a self-owner. Therefore, Cohen claims “The primary commitment of … 
[Nozick’s] philosophy is not to liberty but to the thesis of self-ownership” (Cohen, 1995, 
p. 67). 
In other words, Nozick’s primary moral commitment is to self-ownership and 
only secondarily, to liberty, because libertarianism affirms not freedom as such, but 
freedom of a certain type whose shape is delineated by the thesis of self-ownership.29 
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 Cohen says that he realized that Nozick is primarily committed to self-ownership. He discovered an 
oddity in the views of libertarianism, liberalism and Marxism. Although both liberals and Marxists do not 
formulate their theories in term of self-ownership, Cohen does so to compare what rights each theory grants 
people to themselves. Cohen interprets each theory with respect to self-ownership in the following way: 
Libertarians advocate that people are self-owners. Liberals, who are to the left of libertarians on the 
political spectrum, seem to believe that people are not self-owners although they do not frame the issue in 





Nozick says that individuals are free to use their powers as they wish. But this self-
ownership is not derived from any principle of liberty. As Cohen indicates, Nozick does 
not define any independent form of freedom from which self-ownership is derived 
(Cohen, 1995, p. 67). Nozick thinks that freedom comes first, but in order to be free, 
individuals need self-ownership; hence, a lack of self-ownership means a lack of 
freedom. Nozick’s theory, in reality, treats freedom as a function of self-ownership. He 
does not take into consideration the apparent coercively created and coercively 
maintained state of dependence of workers, who have to sell their labor power in order to 
survive, because they are self-owners, which means they are free in a liber(al)tarian 
moral sense. 
Cohen shows that Nozick’s argument for allowing unequal distribution of rights 
over material resources rests on his contention that self-ownership justifies inequality 
(Cohen, 1995, pp. 70-4). After showing that self-ownership does not legitimate 
inequality, Cohen tries to find a way of distributing rights over material resources in a 
way that will protect people’s self-ownership and achieve his moral commitments to 
equality and autonomy (Cohen, 1995, pp. 92-3). Cohen, whose principal concern is to 
defend a thoroughgoing egalitarian distribution of income (Palmer, 1998, p. 227), argues 
                                                                                                                                            
ownership in their critique of libertarianism (Cohen, 1995, pp. 117-8). For Cohen, the oddity is that both 
libertarians and Marxists affirm self-ownership while simultaneously condemning the other’s theory for 
violating self-ownership. Both libertarians and Marxists criticize the transfer of wealth from one person to 
another. Libertarianism criticizes Marxism because of the wealth transfer from the rich to the poor through 
redistributive taxation. They think that this violates the self-ownership of the rich because they are not 
reaping all the fruits of their labor and market transactions. Similarly, Marxists condemn libertarians 
because they allow the transfer of wealth from the workers to the capitalist through exploitation. They view 
this as violating self-ownership because the workers are not reaping all of the fruits of their labor. Since 
both condemn the transfer of wealth because it violates self-ownership, libertarian theory and Marxist 
theory seem closely tied (Cohen, 1995, pp. 118-9). Cohen’s account is discussed in Chapter IV but it is 
worth to note that, in the lines of Cohen, Marx’s concept of exploitation has mutated into a form of the 





that self-ownership and equality can be reconciled only by abrogating the autonomy of 
individuals (Cohen, 1995, p. 98). 
Cohen notes that for libertarian self-ownership to mean anything substantive, it 
must have an underlying conception of the ownership status of the world’s resources 
(Cohen, 1995, p. 71). This is the case because affirming libertarian self-ownership tells 
only what one can and cannot do with material resources once they are already the 
exclusive property of some as opposed to others. One can use such resources along with 
his own labor to produce things that he will also exclusively own. One cannot take 
resources by force or threat of force from people who have title to them. A title to 
resources indicates that the titleholder(s) legitimately and exclusively own(s) the 
resources. For Nozick, a person’s title to resources is legitimate only if the title of the 
person from whom they received it was legitimate. Thus, to find out whether a title is 
legitimate it is necessary to trace it from past owner to past owner throughout history 
until arriving at the original owner. Nozick argues that if the original owner appropriated 
the resources justifiably and each subsequent transfer of the resources did not violate 
libertarian self-ownership, then the title is legitimate. If all current titles to resources are 
legitimate, the libertarian idea of self-ownership stipulates permissible from 
impermissible ways to exchange titles. However, it does not tell anything about how 
those titles were originally obtained (Nozick in Cohen, 1995, pp. 72-3). Since libertarian 
idea of self-ownership says nothing about acquiring titles to initial resources, the theory 
of original acquisition of titles does not follow from libertarian self-ownership. If the 
initial acquisition of titles to material resources is distributed unequally, their legitimate 





inequality over time. Thus, self-ownership not only perpetuates but also ends up 
justifying inequality. 
First, it is a fallacy to assume that all forms of property historically were private 
property, which ignores the transition from common ownership to private ownership, and 
that capitalist property rights are universal and natural. The following quotation from 
Marx lays bare the libertarian fallacy. He writes: “All production is appropriation of 
nature on the part of an individual within and through a specific form of society. In this 
sense it is tautology to say that property (appropriation) is a precondition of production. 
But it is altogether ridiculous to leap from that to a specific form of [private] property” 
(Marx, 1993, p. 87). During the enclosures in England (and in other places around the 
world), what was common property was made private individual property. Second, the 
people who were driven off the land were made worse off. They did not benefit in any 
shape or form, for instance by being given jobs, providing livelihoods as an outcome of 
the private appropriation of resources.30 On the contrary, as Marx indicates, the enclosure 
had started off an era of human misery and proletarianization of landless peasants (Marx, 
1972a, pp. 718-9).  So even if one accepts Nozick’s definition of what is morally 
acceptable, one would then have to say that by his definition almost all appropriation of 
common resources has not been justified – leading to conclusions opposite to his. 
Also, the Nozickian proviso does not appear to be acceptable to justify property 
rights.31 Cohen rightly claims that Nozick does not provide any arguments for taking the 
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 Dr. Al Campbell proffered this critique in one of our conversations.   
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 The following quotation is vital to understand the absolute market mentality of today’s pharmaceutical 
industries, which is animated in Nozick’s lines: “A medical researcher who synthesizes a new substance 
that effectively treats a certain disease [let’s call it AIDS, or Influenza, or Bubonic Plague, or Malaria, or 
Ebola, or any one of the deadly disease] and who refuses to sell except on his terms does not worsen the 





situation in which the object remains unowned as the base line for assessing 
appropriation. Cohen suggests that different schemes of appropriation should be 
considered in terms of whether any person is made worse off by the actual appropriation 
relative to other schemes of appropriation (Cohen, 1995, p. 78). If person X appropriates 
resource R, whether Y is worse off as a result is not all that matters, because Y might be 
worse off in relation to other alternative outcomes blocked by X’s appropriation of R. For 
instance, Y might have been better off had he appropriated R solely or jointly with X. A 
libertarian can be asked why the world’s resources should not be jointly owned, such that 
each person has an equal veto over the disposal of the world resources (Exdell, 1977, pp. 
146-9; Cohen, 1986b, pp. 80-7). Nozick never explains why the defacto baseline is 
sufficient or necessary in deeming any appropriation as just. The Nozickian proviso only 
tries to justify private property and private appropriation. However, by definition, it 
cannot justify both private property rights in appropriation. 
Cohen addresses the problem by posing hypothetical situations to test whether the 
Nozickian proviso is consistent or not. Table 1 considers a simple model: a two-people 
world consisting of persons A and B in which there is, initially, Lockean common 
ownership of its finite quantity of land. Situation 1 is what actually happens between A 
and B, in which A obtains m from the land and B obtains n where m and n are, say, 
bushels of wheat (or gallons of moose milk, taken from the moose, which neither A nor B 
owns) (Cohen, 1995, p. 81). Cohen supposes that in this hypothetical situation A 
appropriates most of the land or an amount which leaves B less than enough to live off on 
what is left over such that B must sell his labor to A. 
                                                                                                                                            






Table 1 – Counterfactual Situations 
 II. B’s Appropriation 










(b)             
B’s Talent > 
A’s Talent 
(c)               
B’s Talent < 
A’s Talent 
A gets m + q M m + p m + q + r M 
B gets n + p N n + q n + p + s N 
                         q > p ≥ 0)                                                               (r > 0; s > 0) 
Source: Cohen, 1995, p. 81 
 
According to Cohen’s hypothetical model, A pays B a wage (n + p; where p>0) 
such that B’s welfare after the appropriation plus the wage for his labor is equal to B’s 
welfare had there been no appropriation. A obtains m + q from the new arrangement, 
where q is greater than p. The rise in output is due to the productivity of a division of 
labor designed by A, who is a “good organizer” (Cohen, 1995, p. 82). After the 
appropriation, B’s welfare is the same, but A has increased his welfare because of the 
appropriation. According to the Nozickian proviso, A’s appropriation is justified. 
However, B is worse off in a way that is not captured by the proviso: his life is dictated 
by A. Nozick, as someone who is committed to human autonomy, neglects the possibility 
that being under the control of someone else makes one worse off. Nozick’s libertarian 
philosophy says that people control their own lives, or enjoy autonomy, implying that the 
range of a person’s choices is related to his powers of deliberation and self control 
(Nozick, 1974, pp. 34, 48-51). 
The table also offers Situation 2 to compare to Situation 1 to see if B’s potential 
welfare is decreased by A’s appropriation. Suppose that Situation 2 would have occurred 
had Situation 1 not occurred. In Situation 2, B appropriates most of the resources, and A 





any appropriation, but B would be better off than he was in Situation 1. Thus, had A not 
appropriated first (Situation 1), B would have increased his welfare in Situation 2. In 
other words, A’s appropriation robs B’s potential welfare. The situation is symmetrical: 
had Situation 2 occurred instead, A would be the one who is robbed of his potential 
welfare. 
The only way to justify one situation over the other is by some principle such as 
“first come, first serve” (Cohen, 1995, p. 80). Such a principle, however, is biased in 
favor of those who are quicker or greedier than the rest. But, note that for Nozick, a just 
appropriation is not one that is based on speed or greediness, but one that does not 
worsen the condition of others. To truly specify how B would not be made worse off with 
A’s appropriation, B’s welfare after A’s appropriation would have to be compared to B’s 
welfare under all possible alternatives. Situation 2 is a possible and better alternative for 
B that is blocked by A’s appropriation. Nozickian proviso justifies A, even though its 
appropriation makes someone else worse off. Hence, the proviso is inconsistent. Since 
the Nozickian proviso is not consistent, it must be rejected. 
Although Cohen shows that the libertarian account of property is morally 
unjustified, he is still attracted to Nozick’s thesis of self-ownership. Cohen tries to 
reconcile libertarian self-ownership with his moral commitments to equality and 
autonomy (Cohen, 1995, p. 71). He does this by trying to conceive an initial distribution 
of the world’s resources with libertarian self-ownership that would lead to equality. 
Cohen argues that if the world is originally jointly owned, then libertarian self-ownership 
could possibly be consistent with equality. To illustrate this, Cohen gives again a 





ability to labor. Infirm has little ability to labor; however, he is a joint owner of the 
material resources, and thus, has veto power over anything Able may want to produce. 
Each is a self-owner and they own all the material resources jointly. Cohen outlines the 
psychological profile of each as, “rational, self-interested and mutually disinterested” 
(Cohen, 1995, p. 95).32 He then asks how they will arrange production and distribution of 
the burdens and benefits of society. 
There are five possible arrangements for Able and Infirm:  
a) Able cannot produce per day what is needed for one person for a day, so Able and 
Infirm both die. 
 
b) Able can produce enough or more than enough for one person, but not enough for 
two. Infirm lets Able produce what he can, since only spite or envy would lead 
him not to.33 Able lives and Infirm dies. 
 
c) Able can produce just enough to sustain both himself and Infirm. So Infirm forbids 
him to produce unless he produces that much. Able consequently does, and both 
live at subsistence. 
 
d) If Able produces at all, then the amount he produces is determined independently 
of his choice, and it exceeds what is needed to sustain both Able and Infirm. They 
therefore bargain over the distribution of a fixed surplus. The price of failure to 
agree (the “threat point”) is no production, and, therefore, death for both. 
 
e) Again, Able can produce a surplus, but now, more realistically, he can vary its 
size, so that Able and Infirm will bargain not only, as in (d), over who gets how 
much, but also over how much will be produced. 
 
For Cohen, the first three arrangements are uninteresting in terms of distributive 
justice. Since the first two result in either Infirm or both of them dying, there is no need to 
distribute the burdens and benefits of production. The third option involves subsistence 
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33Alternatively, and on the assumption that each must eat in the evening to be alive the next day. Infirm 
allows Able to work for a day on condition that, at the end of it, a lottery decides who gets the food. If 






living for both of them, and thus, distribution is an uninteresting cut in half. The fourth 
and fifth are interesting because they more closely reflect the present economy. They 
involve a surplus of goods above subsistence living. Hence, it is possible to normatively 
evaluate their method of distribution of the burdens and benefits of what is produced to 
see if the conditions of libertarian self-ownership and joint world ownership are 
justifiable. 
To normatively evaluate the situation of Able and Infirm, there is a need to look at 
how they divide the burdens and benefits of production. Due to natural endowment Able 
must produce most of the necessities of life for the both of them. However, since Infirm is 
a joint owner of the material resources, he has veto power over anything Able may want 
to produce. This veto power could hypothetically be enforced by an omnipotent being. 
Hence, for either of them to survive they must bargain over how the material resources 
will be used. The threat point of their bargaining (failure to agree) is death for both. 
Cohen notes that Able’s superior productive capability will not give him an advantage in 
the bargaining process because Infirm can veto any arrangement that he does not think is 
fair. If Able deserves a greater share of what is produced, it is because labor is irksome 
not because it is his labor (Cohen, 1995, p. 96). This could lead to an egalitarian outcome 
in that Able will get enough to compensate for the disutility of labor and a portion equal 
to that of Infirm’s portion. Cohen concludes that joint world ownership prevents 
libertarian self-ownership from generating self-perpetuating inequality, which 
egalitarians would object to (Cohen, 1995, p. 96). He asserts that there is good reason to 
suppose that, at least in a world of people with different measures of talent, self-





ownership over the world’s resources, it is hostile to both equality and human autonomy. 
Accordingly, if everyone is to enjoy a reasonable degree of autonomy, it is necessary, at 
least in some circumstances, to impose restrictions on self-ownership. 
Cohen’s example of Able and Infirm demonstrates that libertarian self-ownership 
combined with joint ownership of the world’s resources can lead to equality. However, 
Cohen rejects this theoretical reconciliation of libertarian self-ownership and equality 
because the concept of libertarian self-ownership becomes devoid of its intent (Cohen, 
1995, p. 98). He writes: “Anyone who supports equality of condition must oppose self-
ownership, even in a world in which rights over external resources have equalized” 
(Cohen, 1995, p. 72). Because, the intent of libertarian self-ownership is to let each 
individual use his or her talents at will as long as they do not harm another. However, 
under joint ownership, neither Able nor Infirm can act without the other’s consent. Since 
each person is at the mercy of the other for survival, their libertarian self-ownership is 
only formal, which is to say that they are not autonomous beings. Hence, libertarian self-
ownership and equality cannot be obtained through joint ownership of the world’s 
resources except by restricting each self-owner’s autonomy. 
Since libertarian self-ownership and equality lose their appeal without autonomy, 
Cohen rejects this reconciliation of libertarian self-ownership with equality, concluding 
that libertarian self-ownership, equality and autonomy are incompatible. Since Cohen 
also has already shown that libertarian self-ownership – even with Nozick’s theory of 
original appropriation does not justify inequality – he asserts that it is antithetical to 





After analyzing the relationship between self-ownership, equality and autonomy, 
Cohen criticizes Marxism in his presented Able & Infirm example as well. In virtue of 
Infirm’s access to the means of production and Able’s separation from those means of 
production, Able is compelled to sell his labor power to Infirm. However, for Cohen, 
because Marxists believe that labor appropriation is exploitative, they are committed to 
saying that Infirm exploits Able and it violates Able’s rights. According to Cohen, this 
shows that Marxists see self-ownership as a virtue, yet that involves a problem from an 
egalitarian point of view because there is nothing objectionable about the arrangement 
between Able and Infirm where Infirm is entitled to some aid from Able on the basis of 
fairness (Cohen, 1995, p. 150). 
Beyond the Irreconcilability of Self-ownership with                                                
Equality and Autonomy 
This section discusses the problematic nature of abstract individualism of 
libertarianism, which is ignored in Cohen’s analytical analysis of Nozick’s theory.34 
Cohen is quite right when he says that the principles of libertarianism try to justify 
the inequalities under capitalism that these principles are incompatible with equality and 
autonomy. Robert Nozick’s libertarian vision provides a defense of the private property 
and free market where each individual is portrayed as a self-owner, sovereign over his 
specific rights. The right to private ownership appears as a fundamental moral or natural 
or theological right in his theory. His individualistic model of self-ownership is the 
conceptual foundation of the defense of pure capitalism in which the right to private 
property is absolute and unquestionable. 
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However, a serious analysis of the foundations of libertarianism requires a further 
discussion. This section questions the logical implications of the foundations of Nozick’s 
libertarian individualism with his theory of right to property, minimal state, Nozickian 
proviso, and Entitlement Theory of Justice. Each argument is separately and jointly 
examined to explore their origin, to analyze their practical implications. It is important to 
note that this critique does not aim to justify or support any form of welfare state models 
or social state models under capitalism. 
First, it is important to note the theological overtone of Nozick’s ideas, and put 
them in some historical context. An insightful explanation of historical significance of 
Locke’s writings for an appropriate comparison with Nozick’s ideas can be found in 
Marx: “Locke’s view is all the more important because it was the classical expression of 
bourgeois society’s ideas of rights as against feudal society, and moreover his philosophy 
served as the basis for all the ideas of the whole of subsequent English political 
economy” (Marx, 1969, p. 367). In the early bourgeois liberal writings self-ownership 
takes on a historically progressive role as a weapon against the noncontractual claims of 
feudal lords to the labor of their serfs as a prelude to the new era of wage-labor. The 
demand for equal rights and the abolition of feudal inequalities was a precondition of the 
economic advance in the emerging capitalist society. By contrast, the abstract 
individualism of the liber(al)tarian-ism has now become the basis of the conservative 
argument against the welfare state, and more broadly against any state intervention in the 
free market economy. This, in essence, proposes to turn back the wheel of history in the 
name of minimizing state intervention and justifying private property. Hegel’s famous 





Marx’s comment on it – “first time as tragedy, the second time as [complete] farce” 
(Marx & Engels, 1969b, p. 398) – in connection with liber(al)tarian individualism. Thus, 
it is not without justification that the rebirth of self-ownership is a kind of effort that 
brings medieval philistinism to life. Thus, communitarian thinker C. Taylor is right to 
accuse Nozick of extreme individualism (Taylor, 1985, p. 187). 
Similarly, Marx and Engels comment on Max Stirner (1806-1856), an early 
ideologist of bourgeois individualism and an originator of the idea of self-ownership, 
who equated personality with private property (Carus, 1972, p. 96).35 They write: “Our 
kindly, credulous Jacques [Stirner] takes the bourgeois play on the words Eigentum 
[property] and Eigenschaft [characteristic feature] so literally, in such holy earnest, that 
he even endeavors to behave like a private property-owner in relation to his own 
features” and “his egoistical property, property in the extraordinary sense, is nothing but 
ordinary or bourgeois property transfigured by his sanctifying fantasy” (Marx & Engels, 
1976, pp. 232, 368). In the lines of Nozick, human personality is equated with bourgeois 
private property by using self-ownership, which idolizes private ownership and justifies 
selfishness, to reproduce abstract and happy forms of capitalism. 
It is also questionable that Nozick’s moral principles are borrowed from Kant and 
Locke as he argues they are. Nozick thinks that both the principle of self-ownership and 
the right to private property derive from the idea of treating people as morally equal and 
free, or as “ends in themselves.” However, his concept of rights refers to those rights that 
are thought to exist independently of social recognition and legal enforcement (Lyons, 
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1984, p. 111). In Nozick’s theory, the principle of self-ownership, upon which the idea of 
moral rights is based, appears to be an abstract expression of the right to private property.  
In addition, Nozick’s concept of human autonomy based on rationality and free 
will is ambiguous since his concept of self-ownership lacks any notion of self-realization. 
In Nozick’s theory, men have the right to live separate lives because they are “capable of 
choosing autonomously among alternatives” (Nozick, 1974, p. 48). This capability is 
founded upon three characteristics: “rationality, free will and moral agency” (Nozick, 
1974, p. 49). Nozick seems to believe that it is these characteristics of which each self 
consists. However, Nozick does not present any theory concerning the role of society or 
any divine power in the development of human rationality, free will, and moral agency. 
The life of each person has a connection neither with God nor with society, but with the 
person himself. Since the self has no connection with society, his theory of the right to 
self and property is not different from any abstract dogmatic theology that holds people 
free on metaphysical grounds. As a result, Nozick “abstracts self-ownership from its 
social and economic presuppositions, and thereby he understands it in terms of 
metaphysics as a pure individualistic matter” (Papaioannou, 2010, p. 17). 
In the writings of the early representatives of natural law and natural rights 
tradition, like Locke and Kant, human beings have a theological and metaphysical 
essence that makes them equal, free, and inviolable. During the Enlightenment, the idea 
that men had certain God given rights gained popularity because that was a revolutionary 
idea at the time where birthrights were commonplace. Paul Kelly remarks that for Locke, 
people are equal and free because he thinks that they are the property of God, and so one 





conception of self-ownership, one can kill himself or alienate himself from another, 
because in his view “one first needs a theory of property rights before one can apply any 
supposed right to life. … the right to life cannot provide the foundation for a theory of 
property rights” (Nozick, 1974, p. 179). That is why for Nozick, an atheist pastor, self-
owner’s kith and kin is not God but private property. The first conclusion to be drawn 
here is that Nozick’s libertarianism is not supported by any considerations of equality and 
freedom. Instead, his understanding of equality and freedom rests on the notion of free 
exchange and the right to private property. 
Similarly, Nozick’s interpretation and treatment of Kant is not compatible with 
Kant’s own writings contrary to what he argues. In Nozick’s theory people can choose to 
be treated as if they are things, which can be alienating and enslaving. On the other hand, 
some argue that when Kant writes persons are “ends in themselves” he means that he 
treats “human beings as persons rather than things” (Ellerman, 1988, pp. 1109-10).36 
Ellerman argues that, contrary to Nozick’s interpretation of Kant, the Kantian 
person/thing principle regards human beings as persons “opposed to being used as 
nonperson or thing” (Ellerman, 1988, p. 1113).37 Kant’s conception of human beings as 
distinct individuals who have dignity is not consistent with the implications of Nozick’s 
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 In order to partly clarify Kantian principle and show its irrelevance to Nozik’s concept it is worth taking 
the exact quotation from Kant. Kant writes: “Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature, 
have none the less, if they are nonrational beings, only a relative value as means and are consequently 
called things. Rational beings, on the other hand, are called persons because their  nature already marks 
them out as ends in themselves-that is, as something which ought not be used merely as a means-and 
consequently imposes to that extent a limit on all arbitrary treatment of them (and is an object of 
reverence)” (Kant, 1964, p. 96).   
37
 Marx’s analysis of commodification of labor has some similarities with that of Kant. Marx’s concept of 
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difference of Marx’s works on human nature from other concepts is that they have very strong roots in the 





moral principles. In brief, beyond the crime of tweezing ideas of the great thinkers, 
Nozick’s theory of rights is inconsistent and incomprehensible. 
According to Susan Akin (1946-2004), Nozick’s principle of self-ownership can 
result in “a bizarre combination of matriarchy and slavery” (Okin, 1989, p. 75). Okin 
argues that Nozick talks about people’s claims to the products of their labor, but he 
ignores the fact that people are themselves the product of someone else’s labor, namely, 
their mothers. Why, then, does the mother, who meets all of Nozick’s criteria for 
legitimate ownership of the resulting product, not own her baby (Okin, 1989, p. 80)? 
Therefore, it seems that “matriarchal slavery” as a form of injustice likely makes 
Nozick’s theory run into self-contradiction. 
Robert Nozick does not defend private property and free market economy on the 
grounds of economic efficiency, nor does he justify distribution on the grounds of 
marginal productivity.38 But his arguments rely on the notion of the minimal state, which 
is open to criticism on the basis of new developments in economic theory. Namely, both 
the theory of “contested exchange” and “transaction cost” economics, contrary to the 
Orthodox canon, reject an insular view of how markets work independently of 
institutions. Economic organizations and how markets work are also looked at through 
the lens of power.39 In the standard Walrasian theory of competitive markets that Nozick 
assumes considerations of power and coercion are absent by assumption. As Bowles and 
Gintis remark, the only kind of power Orthodox economists would understand is 
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 E. K. Hunt (2002) refers several times to the marginal productivity theory as the main theory of 
distributive justice and one of the major tenets of neoclassical theory. 
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 For a detailed discussion of contested exchange, transaction costs, and roles of power and state in free 
economy, see Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (1993), Robert Rider (1999), Douglas North (Chapter 
Three, 1981), Oliver Williamson (2005), Ronald Coase (1937), and Karl Polanyi (2001). Also, it is 
important to have a discussion of state; however, it is left untouched since working on state would not be 
satisfactory without a full discussion. For a detailed and sophisticated discussion of state see Karl Marx and 





“purchasing power” (Bowles & Gintis, 1992, p. 351). The way “production, allocation 
and distribution of wealth promote certain forms of power, regulate the exercise of this 
power, and establish the conditions for access to positions of power” undermines the 
certain forms of freedom under free market economy (Bowles & Gintis, 1992, p. 351). 
Nozick does not question the inequalities of power between the rich and the poor: a rich 
person’s charity does nothing to eliminate unequal power. Likewise, he does not take into 
account that under the existing inequalities in market economy wealth can buy power and 
the wealthy can force others into involuntary exchange since they have the means to 
provide employment. 
In addition, Nozick takes it for granted that the emergence of free market 
economy was spontaneous, ignoring the important role of the state. For instance, it has 
been argued that the nineteenth century state was a market maker and a market modifier 
organization; such that “the liberal economic order was designed by the early English 
political economists and was instituted by the power of state” (Polanyi-Lewitt, 1995, p. 
4). According to Polanyi, the early English political economists, such as J. Townsend 
(1739-1816), T. R. Malthus (1766-1834), D. Ricardo (1772-1823), J. Bentham (1748-
1832), and E. Burke (1729-1797), constructed an intellectual system in which “the drive 
for a competitive market acquired the irresistible impetus of a process of Nature” 
(Polanyi, 2001, p. 132). “The self-regulating free market economy,” Polanyi writes, “was 
believed to follow from the inexorable laws of Nature, and the unshackling of the market 
to be an ineluctable necessity” (Polanyi, 2001, p. 132). Polanyi never believes that the 
market could really be fully disembedded from society; this is why he says that the 





reality. When Polanyi writes, “the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia” 
(Polanyi, 2001, p. 3), he means that the project of disembedding the economy from 
society was impossible. The role of the state in market economy since it emerged 
invalidates Nozick’s ahistorical concept of the minimal state for his theory of justice. 
Neither Nozick or any liber(al)tarian would deny that force – which makes his theory of 
justice run into self-contradiction – is always needed to enable the free market to operate. 
An insightful explanation of Nozick’s concept of justice under capitalism can be 
found in the lines of Paul M. Sweezy (1910-2004) who writes:  
Those who regard capitalist forms as natural and eternal – and, generally 
speaking, this includes most of those who live under capitalist forms – accept 
appearance as a true representation of social relations. On this foundation there 
has been erected the whole vast superstructure of ethical and legal principles 
which serve at once to justify the existing order and to regulate man’s conducts 
towards it. (Sweezy, 1968, p. 39)40 
 
Nozick’s moral theory does not go beneath the superficial forms to the underlying 
relations of man to man, and man to state. His theory of minimal state and justice in 
terms of abstract principles of libertarianism ignores the historically relative character of 
capitalist justice and capitalist legality because “it is only by means of a critical analysis 
of commodity production … we can see the historical character of capitalism itself” 
(Sweezy, 1968, p. 39). Nozick’s conception of freedom thus appears, as an intellectual 
confusion because he accepts the relations between buyer and seller, who confront each 
other as equal and free, as true representations of social relations. Therefore, this sort of 
confrontation slights the social nature of man. The following quotation lays bare the 
libertarian conception of freedom:   
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 Similarly, after a critical examination of the commodity production Marx writes: “In present bourgeois 
society as a whole, this positing of prices and their circulation etc. appears as the surface process, beneath 
which, however, in the depths, entirely different processes go on, in which this apparent individual equality 





[The bourgeois conception of freedom] is the right to do everything that harms no 
one else. The limits within which anyone can act without harming someone else 
are defined by law... It is a question of the liberty of man as an isolated monad, 
withdrawn into himself… The [bourgeois] right of man to liberty is not based on 
the association of man with man but on the separation of man from man. It is the 
right of this separation, the right of the restricted individual, withdrawn into 
himself. The practical application of man’s right to liberty is man’s right to 
private property… It makes every man see in other men not the realization of his 
own freedom, but the barrier to it… None of the so-called rights of man, 
therefore, go beyond man as a member of civil society, that is, an individual 
withdrawn into himself, into the confines of his private interests and private 
caprice, and separated from the community… The sole bond holding them 
together is natural necessity, need and private interest, the preservation of their 
property and egoistic selves. (Marx & Engels, 1975, pp. 162-4) 
 
The passage poses the question of what is meant by freedom under capitalism. 
The freedom of the individual is a right to acquire private property. This 
conceptualization considers freedom as “the movement of the alienated life elements like 
property, industry, religion, etc.; [however] in reality, this is the perfection of … slavery 
and … inhumanity” (Marx & Engels, 1956, p. 157), masking the true social relations of 
man. Therefore, in Nozick’s theory, the only legitimate function of a just state is to 
protect the properties of individuals from the invasions of others. That is why, for 
Nozick, the redistributive policy is the greatest horror that manifests its presence as a 
violation of justice under capitalism each time a millionaire is taxed a penny (Haworth, 
1994, p. 71). 
Also, the libertarian perception that redistribution is to be left to the gifts and 
voluntary charitable donations is arguable. Nozick argues that philanthropy and voluntary 
charitable contributions from the rich to the poor are the best way to reduce poverty 
(Nozick, 1974, p. 265). He says, “[a philanthropist] will continue to contribute so long as 
the others do (and will view his own contribution as very important, given that the others 





societies, economic privation cannot be handled by individual charity. It was helpful to 
some extent during the medieval ages, because villagers knew each other well enough to 
govern relations “through norms, including, when necessary, a norm of charity, but now 
it can be handled by states” (Hardin, 1999, p. 39).  
Last but not least, Nozick’s principle of justice in transfers assumes that the 
earlier owner had a legitimate title. The validity of property rights depends on the validity 
of previous property rights. Then, determining the validity of current property rights 
requires going back down the chain of transfers to the beginning. But what is the 
beginning? If the beginning of the series of transfers is not when the world was created, 
rather, when the first appropriation took place by an individual in Nozick’s theory, justice 
requires that the initial acquisition was legitimate (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 110-1). Nozick is 
aware that he needs an account to justify private ownership and appropriation. He 
remarks that there were times when “things come into the world attached to people, who 
have entitlements over them” (Nozick, 1974, p. 160).  
Beyond that Nozick ignores the conditions that led to the emergence of private 
property, especially the pervasive role played by force. This makes it hard to use 
Nozick’s theory to defend existing inequalities. Generally the liber(al)tarians avoid 
talking about actual history, because, as Marx remarks, the history of private property is 
replete with “conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, briefly force, play the great part” 
(Marx, 1972a, p. 714).41 The following quotation from Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-
1778) and Thorstein Veblen’s (1857-1929) ideas about the emergence of private 
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all their own means of production had been robbed, and “all the guarantees of existence afforded by the old 
feudal arrangements. And the history of this, their expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in 





property, which represent different historical periods and different schools of thought, are 
perfectly compatible with Marx’s comments on the role of violence at the origin of 
private property. Rousseau, contrary to the belief that he condones private appropriation, 
sees private property as the source of all human misery. He writes: 
The first man who, having enclosed a piece of land, took it into his head to say, 
‘This is mine,’ and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true 
founder of civil society. The human race would have been spared endless crimes, 
wars, murders, and horrors if someone had pulled up the stakes or filled in the 
ditch and cried out to his fellow men, ‘Do not listen to this impostor! You are lost 
if you forget that fruits of the earth belong to everyone, ant the earth to no one.’ 
(Rousseau, 1984, p. 109) 
 
Similarly, Veblen’s account of the origin of private property is compatible with 
Marx’s conceptualization. Veblen argues that private property developed during the 
predatory phase of the society and did not exist in the earlier peaceable period.42 The 
taking of captives, who were mostly women, was its historical origin which in turn began 
with the emergence of an economic surplus ushering in the predatory phase of social 
evolution (Veblen, 1898, pp. 353-65).  
The pervasive role of violence in all these accounts of the historical emergence of 
private property implies that the initial appropriation of resources was illegitimate, and 
that in turn implies that the tittles to current wealth are illegitimate. According to 
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 Primitive man’s being peaceful and cooperative is relevant in this context since it coincides with Herbert 
Gintis’s argument on the “loss aversion” which made primitive man tend to avoid possible conflicts with 
his surroundings, since he valued loss higher than gain (Gintis, 2007, p. 15). Similarly, Stephen Hymer’s 
interpretation of Robinson Crusoe is agreeable with the point presented here since Friday becomes 
Robinson's private property with deliberate and effective use of violence as an enforcement mechanism. 
With the use of violence, property relation was enforced to an extent that, after a point, even if Robinson 
does not use violence, the treat of using it makes Friday accept the hierarchy of Robinson. The central 
focus of Hymer’s interpretation is on how Crusoe, the slave trader, uses the surplus of others to create a 
fortune. Hymer’s analysis shows that Crusoe did not have any rights and merits till Thursday. After Friday 






Nozick’s theory, illegitimate acquisitions should be rectified: the principle of justice in 
rectification. 
However, it is often impossible to know who the rightful owners are. Nozick 
suggests that the illegitimacy of the existing title should be rectified by a onetime general 
redistribution of resources in accordance with Rawls’ difference principle.43 Only after 
this redistribution of resources will the libertarian principle of transfer hold. However, as 
David Lyons argues, Nozick’s ahistorical conceptualization implies that much of North 
America should be returned to the Native American, whose initial title was unjustly taken 
away (Lyons, 1981, pp. 374-5). Also, it has been argued that Nozick’s principle of 
rectification requires reparations to African Americans for slavery (Valls, 1999, p. 229). 
Etruscan theocrat, Norman baron, American slave-owner, new or old colonizer, modern 
landlord or capitalist, they are all on the same chain through history. Put simply, 
Epimetheus Nozick opens up a Pandora’s Box by trying to rectify past injustices in 
appropriation. 
Contrary to Nozick’s contention, his theory of distributive justice has no basis in 
history (De Gregori, 1979, p. 20). Far from being historical in any significant sense, 
Nozick’s theory pointedly ignores human history. His principles of justice in acquisition 
and the principle of justice in transfer are dubious. 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has tried to critically reflect on Nozick’s individualistic moral and 
political theory by drawing attention to the foundations of his libertarian theory of justice 
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 John Rawls calls his second principle the difference principle. According to the principle, social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: i) “to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged,” and ii) “attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions for fair equality of 





to show that libertarianism does not generate any kind of defendable philosophy of 
justice for capitalism. As Cohen has shown that the libertarian theory of private property 
based on the premise of self-ownership is compatible neither with equality nor autonomy 
which are, Cohen argues, the defining characteristics of a just society. 
Nozick’s theory of individual rights presupposes a form of individualism that is 
problematical because the self-owner is disembedded from society and lacks sociality. 
Nozick extols the virtues of the enlightenment period individualism to justify laissez faire 
capitalism. His abstract individualism reduces human beings to alienable things, to 
disembedded individuals who can be commodified. The notion of self-ownership 
neglects the noneconomic nature of man and extols the virtues of acting like homo 
economicus. His account of consent is at best superficial, and falls far short of 
conceptualizing dignified individuals with the inviolable rights that they are thought to 
posses in classical moral theory. Thus, his exceedingly selective reliance on Kant and 
Locke is inconsistent with the spirit of their work. Nozick’s single minded idealization of 
private property and self-interested behavior on the basis of the principle of self-
ownership amounts to a philosophical rejection of the very concept of society. 
Nozick’s account of the minimal state is a way to spread out the absolute 
individual rights to his political theory. Nozick neglects the role of the state in the 
emergence and functioning of free market economy because of his overemphasis on its 
capacity to self-regulate. Since Nozick’s theory of the minimal state relies on abstract and 
metaphysical individualism on the basis of the principle of self-ownership, which is 






Nozick’s Entitlement Theory of Justice is more about the rights to property, rather 
than about justice. Its main function is to protect and maintain the status quo under 
capitalism. As long as historical injustice is unresolved, Nozick’s theory of justice 
implies that the status quo is invalid. Therefore, if one wishes to challenge liber(al)tarian 
arguments on justice and capitalism today, then, one should be interested in revisiting 
Nozick, refuting the key elements of his theory and showing the inconsistency in these 
elements as this study tries to do.  
The next chapter explores Marx’s analysis and critique of capitalism. It is argued 
that Marx’s analysis of the labor process under capitalist production is the crucial element 
of his critique of the damage done to human autonomy and human development in 
capitalist society. Therefore, this study argues that capitalism is a barrier to human 
autonomy as socioeconomic system because the capitalist mode of production impairs 





















KARL MARX’S ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM AND HIS 
CONCEPT OF JUSTICEAND HUMAN AUTONOMY 
Introduction 
The reaction of Analytical Marxists – or anyone committed to egalitarian society 
– to the growing inequality under the capitalist market economy is understandable. As 
Hardin remarks, the moral thinkers from Aristotle and Catholic philosophers, to modern 
time writers have viewed inequality as morally tainted, requiring some kind of 
rectification (Hardin, 1999, p. 399). The history of inequality is as old as the history of 
class divided societies. The early socialists such as Saint-Simonists, Fourierists, English 
Chartists etc., had the same requiem against the inequalities of infant capitalism. Engels 
rightfully criticizes them by writing: “they represented the infancy of the proletarian 
movement just as astrology and alchemy represented the infancy of science” (Marx, 
1936, p. 561). Marx is one of the most misunderstood philosophers the world has ever 
known. As Cohen is yet another example of this, Marx’s critique of capitalism is 
mistakenly thought to rest on a moral indictment of inequality and exploitation is 
associated with. Indeed, there are many passages in Capital (1972a) that can give rise to 





Given the important role the discussion of exploitation plays in Cohen’s writings, 
it is worth talking about how Marx uses the term before talking about Marx’s critique of 
capitalism.  
First, it should be noted that there are many uses of the term exploit in English. 
The term can have a moral connotation, but also not, as in “exploiting a mine.” These 
uses are not a topic in the current discussion. Joel Feinberg’s interpretation of 
exploitation is close to that of Marx’s, focusing on the wage and labor relationship. He 
writes, “the word ‘exploitation’ is a technical term in Marxist economic theory, in which 
it refers to the coercive process by which capitalists hire workers for bare minimal wages 
because the workers have no alternatives except to starve. Then all the wealth created by 
the worker’s labor (surplus value) goes to the employer” (Feinberg, 1990, p. 178). In 
addition, similarly, Paul M. Sweezy, as one of the leading Marxist economists of the 
second half of the twentieth century, interprets Marx’s concept of exploitation in the 
labor process more as a technical term than a moral one. He writes: “in many 
noncapitalist societies (e.g. slavery and feudalism) the product of surplus labor is 
appropriated by a special class which in one way or another maintains its control over the 
means of production.” He continues: “What is specific to capitalism is thus not the fact of 
exploitation of one part of the population by another, but the form which this exploitation 
assumes, namely the production of surplus value” (Sweezy, 1968, p. 62). However, to 
grasp Marx’s most general conception of exploitation one must look at the following 
passage from The German Ideology: 
Holbach depicts the entire activity of individuals in their mutual intercourse, e.g. 
speech, love, etc., as a relation of utility and utilization … In this case, the utility 
relation has a quite definite meaning, namely, that I derive benefit for myself by 





actually the case with the bourgeois. For him only one relation is valid on its own 
account – the relation of exploitation; all other relations have validity for him only 
insofar as he can include them under this one relation, and even where he 
encounters relations which cannot be directly subordinated to the relation of 
exploitation, he does at least subordinate them to it in his imagination. The 
material expression of this use is money represents the value of all things, people 
and social relations. (Marx & Engels, 1976, pp. 409-10) 
 
What is most striking in the passage is the extreme generality of the concept of 
exploitation. Marx describes all bourgeois relations as relations of harmful utilization for 
gain.  According to Allen Buchanan, exploitation is not limited to the labor process itself. 
It is not simply that the bourgeois exploits the worker in the wage and labor relationship: 
“The point, rather, is that for the bourgeois human relations in general are exploitative, 
and this includes not only his relations with the worker, but with his fellow bourgeois as 
well … [and] money facilitates the exploitation of every human capacity because it 
enable us to attach a price to every human capacity and to purchase control over its 
exercise” (Buchanan, 1979, pp. 125, 127). The point here is that the exploitative nature of 
capitalism accustoms individuals to think of human capacities as saleable and encourages 
exploitative relations among the members of society. The unconscious impact of 
capitalism on individuals will be argued below briefly, but it is worth noting that 
Buchanan’s interpretation of exploitation attracts attention to the adverse impact of 
capitalist relations on individuals at an unconscious level. Even though Buchanan does 
not examine the unconscious ill effect of capitalism on the psyche of the individual, his 
approach is important for bringing to awareness this unconscious impact. However, 
beyond the unconscious impact of exploitative relations under capitalism on individuals, 
it is argued that an accurate interpretation of Marx writings indicates that Marx’s concept 





appropriation and oppression. Thus, exploitation is broader and more complex than in 
Cohen’s account. Therefore, Cohen’s interpretation gives an impoverished view of 
Marx’s critique of capitalism as an unjust social formation. 
The first section of this chapter investigates Marx’s writings, especially Capital 
(1972a) to elucidate his notion of the creation and appropriation of surplus value, on the 
one hand, the social character of men’s labor in commodity production, on the other, 
since Cohen thinks that there is only one important part of Marx’ economic theory, the 
theory of exploitation and he deems it worthy of serious consideration. It is argued that 
this conceptualization ignores Marx’s analysis of the defining characteristics of capitalist 
production. 
The second part of the chapter explores Marx’s writings on justice and moral 
critique of capitalism. Finally, Marx’s concept of human nature is discussed in 
connection with his critique of capitalism on the basis of alienation and commodity 
fetishism. 
Karl Marx’s Analysis of Labor and Capitalism 
Marx begins Capital (1972a) by analyzing commodities as a starting point for 
understanding how capitalist society functions.44 First, Marx describes the dual character 
of the commodity. There are two aspects of a commodity: qualitative and quantitative.  
One aspect of the commodity is defined by how it is used. Marx calls this use value. 
Viewed qualitatively, a commodity is a use value. Marx defines use value by how the 
commodity “satisfies human wants of some sort or another” (Marx, 1972a, p. 35). When 
looked at as merely a use value, the commodity is indistinguishable from the process of 
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satisfying human wants. So, as various kinds of uses to fulfill human wants, commodities 
“constitute the substance of all wealth, whatever may be the social form of that wealth” 
(Marx, 1972a, p. 36). However, Marx concludes that a commodity has some 
characteristics that are specific to capitalism, which only become clear when looking at 
its other aspect: exchange value. Viewed quantitatively, a commodity is an exchange 
value, which is not its physical or natural property. Exchange value implies an abstraction 
from the useful qualities and natural properties a commodity has. The substance of value 
is labor and the form of appearance of value in capitalism is exchange value. 
The use value acquires value through exchange by independent producers. The 
nexus of exchange establishes the social relationship between producers and products 
within the social division of labor, and it is in this sense that exchange value is 
constituted by social relations. Marx writes: “It is only by being exchanged that the 
products of labor acquire, as values, one uniform social status, distinct from their varied 
forms of existence as objects of utility” (Marx, 1972a, p. 73). Once exchange is realized, 
labor acquires a twofold social character. Firstly, it must be useful concrete labor to 
satisfy some social need, and secondly, it must become abstract labor to be 
commensurate with other forms of labor. 
Commodities circulate in the market by the actions taken by their owners. For 
commodities to enter into a relationship with each other, their owners must enter into a 
relation. Commodities, as things, are in principle alienable. For exchange to occur, it is 
necessary that each person treats others as i) the private owners of those alienable objects, 





reciprocally independent and atomic (Marx, 1972a, p. 92) and fixes this form of relation 
as historically specific to the capitalist mode of production. 
Money, Marx argues, is a requirement of the exchange process: it is “a crystal 
formed of necessity in the course of exchanges, whereby different products of labor are 
practically equated to one another and thus by practice converted into commodities” 
(Marx, 1972a, p. 86). Petit bourgeois individualist visions of commodity exchange 
without the evil of money are, Marx clarifies, foolish and understandable. They are 
foolish because to get rid of money while leaving commodity production untouched is 
like retaining “Catholicism without the Pope” (Marx, 1972a, p. 87). Catholics and 
capitalists would have to reinvent the Pope and money respectively. 
Goods involved in the market exchange appear as though they have a volition of 
their own. Money grows out of the exchange process and acquires the appearance of 
having an intrinsic value, and the goods acquire a super natural sense as if living in 
Alice’s Wonderland.45 Ultimately, the super natural qualities of money, whether viewed 
as good by the capitalists or evil by the petit-bourgeois-individualist-socialists, are part of 
a socially produced illusion that arises out of the exchange process (Marx, 1972a, p. 92). 
On the face of it, the capitalist goes to market, spends money on inputs for 
production, and produces a commodity which is sold for a value greater than what he 
spent for his inputs. The circuit “M-C-M'” “takes place entirely within the sphere of 
circulation” (Marx, 1972a, p. 164). The problem as summarized in Chapter V of Capital 
(1972a) is: how can surplus (M') arise from the exchange of equivalents. Circulation 
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Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1978) tells of a girl named Alice in a strange, mysterious and surreal 
world, which is topsy-turvy as capitalism, where words take on different meanings and nothing is quite as it 





creates no values and certainly no surplus value: “it is plain that no one abstracts more 
value… from circulation. There is no creation of surplus value” (Marx, 1972a, p. 160). 
Marx argues that the capitalist must have found something in the first exchange 
(M-C) that allows him to realize a surplus. Since equivalents are exchanged for 
equivalents in the market, the surplus cannot arise out of exchange. The capitalist is 
fortunate enough to acquire in the market a commodity whose use value is greater than its 
exchange value: labor power. Marx defines labor power as follows: “By labor power or 
capacity for labor is to be understood the aggregate of those mental and physical 
capabilities existing in a human being, which he exercises whenever he produces a use 
value of any description” (Marx, 1972a, p. 167). Labor power is introduced to distinguish 
the form labor takes in capitalist production. Put simply there has always been labor. But 
special historical conditions must occur for there to appear in the market labor for sale 
and thus, labor with an exchange value. The worker must be free to sell or alienate his 
physical and mental capacities. Most importantly, the worker must lack the materials and 
instruments necessary for production. So, Marx writes of the free laborer, “free in the 
double sense, that as a free man he can dispose of his labor power as his own commodity, 
and that on the other hand he has no other commodity for sale, is short of everything 
necessary for the realization of his labor power” (Marx, 1972a, p. 169). Labor power is 
the result of specific historical conditions, Marx states: “Nature does not produce on the 
one side owners of money or commodities, and on the other men possessing nothing but 
their own labor power. This relation has no natural basis, neither is its social basis one 





The capitalist historical epoch is distinguished by the appearance (out of the 
dissolution of feudal ties) of labor power and that “takes in the eyes of laborer himself the 
form of a commodity which is his property; his labor consequently becomes wage-labor” 
(Marx, 1972a, p. 170). When this point has been reached – labor having exchange value – 
the commodified form of labor has become universal. 
The capitalist, Marx argues, is fortunate to have found the one commodity, which, 
as noted above, has an exchange value which is less than the value it can produce. Put 
simply, it is fortunate that the labor it hires creates more value than it costs. “Therefore, 
the value of labor power, and the value which that labor power creates in the labor 
process, are two entirely different magnitudes; and this difference of the two values was 
what the capitalist had in view, when he was purchasing the labor power” (Marx, 1972a, 
p. 193).46 It is the concrete useful character of labor which is responsible for creating the 
value, turning means of production into a new product. Labor gives rise to a new creation 
for one extinguished. Marx, in Chapter Eight of Capital (1972a) emphasizes that means 
of production only transfer a value that exists prior to the production process, whereas 
labor produces new value. Marx introduces the categories, constant and variable capital 
to clarify this distinction (Sydney, 2010, p. 1).47 Constant capital is “represented by the 
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 Not only is the value produced by labor power during a normal working day different from labor power’s 
own value, but the capitalist purchases labor power exactly because of this difference. Hence, the creation 
of surplus value, hence, the exploitation of the worker, hence, for Marx, the true source of all property 
income. Marx’s analysis shows that profits, interest, and rents (and all other nonwage incomes) are merely 
the divisions of surplus value among the capitalist class. Marx treats surplus value and profits as though 
they are identical, in order to explain and make clear the origins and magnitude of income derived solely 
from ownership of property.      
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 The dividing line between constant and variable capital in the process of creating value and surplus value 
is the same as that between objective and subjective factors of the labor process. These two aspects, 
constant and variable capital, form the objective and subjective aspects of production (Ehrbar, 2010, pp. 
1423-4): “The same elements of capital which, from the point of view of the labor process, present 
themselves respectively as the objective and subjective factors, as means of production and labor power, 
presents themselves, from the point of view of the process of creating surplus value, as constant and 





means of production, by the raw material, auxiliary material and the instruments of labor” 
(Marx, 1972a, p. 209) and its defining characteristic is that its value does not change in 
production. By contrast, variable capital is that part of capital advanced that undergoes an 
alteration in value during production. “It both reproduces the equivalent of its own value, 
and also produces an excess, a surplus value, which may itself vary, may be more or less 
according to circumstances” (Marx, 1972a, p. 209). 
Marx says that labor process has a twofold character: it is abstract labor and 
concrete labor. If what counts, from the perspective of producing use values, is concrete 
labor and the qualities of the object, then, from the perspective of producing surplus value 
what counts is abstract labor and its quantity.48 Marx states that concrete labor is “the 
medium for expressing abstract human labor” (Marx, 1972a, p. 58). Abstract labor lives 
on in the commodity as labor. Marx says that as values, the commodities are crystallized 
abstract labor (Marx, 1972a, p. 40). For Marx, abstract labor is a social and historical 
category. More accurately, it is the form labor takes when subsumed by capital. 
What counts for the capitalist is quantity, specifically a quantity of labor power 
measured by time.49 “Labor does not count as productive activity with a specific utility, 
but simply as value-creating substance, as social labor in general which is in the act of 
objectifying itself and whose sole feature of interest is its quantities” (Marx, 1990, p. 
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 Ehrbar explains what Marx means by counts that there is a discrepancy between what the commodity is 
(physically) and what it counts as socially, between its physical existence and what it represents is the value 
relation. By count as the embodiment of “abstract human labor” Marx means: “the tailor produces 
something which cannot only be used as a garment, but which can also be exchanged. The tailoring labor 
makes more than just coats” (Ebrbar, 2010, p. 402). 
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 E.K. Hunt (Hunt, 2002, p. 211) explains that “abstract labor determines exchange value” means Marx has 
two important qualifications. First, it is only the socially necessary labor time that counts: “The labor time 
socially necessary is that required to produce an article under the normal conditions of production, and with 
the average degree of skill and intensity prevalent at the time” (Marx, 1972a, p. 39). Second, the 
computation of values requires that skilled labor be reduced to a simple multiple of unskilled labor. As 
Marx puts it in The Poverty of Philosophy: “we should not say that one man’s hour is worth another man’s 
hour, but rather that one man during an hour is worth just as much as another man during an hour. Time is 





1012). Marx continues, “in the eyes of capital each sphere of production is simply a 
sphere in which capital is invested in order to produce more money, in order to maintain 
and increase already existing money or to acquire surplus labor” (Marx, 1990, p. 1012). 
In order to produce surplus value, the capitalist is compelled to use labor power for a 
period of time in excess of the time necessary to produce value equal to the variable 
capital advanced. The capitalist advances variable capital with the intent of extracting 
surplus labor time; generates surplus value through the mechanism of absolute surplus 
value through lengthening of the working day beyond the time necessary to produce a 
quantity of commodities of value equal to the variable capital advanced. Chapter Ten of 
Capital (1972a) is devoted to a detailed historical account of the actual struggle between 
capitalists and workers to determine the length of the working day. Marx argues that 
capitalists struggle to extend the length of the working day to the limit of human 
endurance: if one tries to derive the length of working day from the laws of commodity 
exchange, one gets different results if one looks at it from the point of view of the worker 
than if one looks at it from the point of view of the capitalist (Ehrbar, 2010, p. 1451). 
Marx’s description of the history of this struggle is rich in detail and cannot be 
summarized here. In a nutshell, the motive of capitalists engaged in this struggle is, “in its 
blind unrestrainable passion, its werewolf hunger for surplus labor, capital oversteps not 
only the moral, but even the merely physical maximum bounds of the working day…All 
that concerns it is simply and solely the maximum of labor power, that can be rendered 
fluent in a working day” (Marx, 1972a, pp. 264-5).50 
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 “The establishment of a normal working-day” Marx writes, “is the result of centuries of struggle between 
capitalist and laborer.” In every instance of this conflict, “Capital is reckless of the health or length of life 
of the laborer, unless under compulsion from society” (Marx, 1972a, p. 270). Marx notes that “though the 





However, the desire to increase surplus value through absolute surplus value 
reaches certain limits in the length of the working day.  The capitalist now increases 
surplus value by shortening the period of necessary labor time rather than by lengthening 
the period of surplus labor time. With this development “capitalist production now 
establishes itself as a mode of production sui generis;” a revolutionized mode of 
production through the application of the social forces of production (science and 
technology) to the labor process, which Marx refers to as the “real subsumption of labor” 
under capital. “The real subsumption of labor under capital is developed in all the forms 
evolved by relative, as opposed to absolute surplus value” (Marx, 1990, p. 1035). The 
development of the process of “relative surplus value” necessarily entails revolutionizing 
the means of production. The impetus for this is inherent in the nature of the constraints 
on the capitalist. The desire to do so is greatly enhanced when the capitalist realizes the 
“laws of competition” and that such techniques could lead to super profits visàvis other 
producers using older techniques. Chapter Twelve of Capital (1972a) clearly manifests 
that the capitalist’s werewolf hunger for surplus labor, desire to get more surplus value 
kindles every single effort to increase productivity (Marx, 1972a, pp. 317-9). 
It is worth noting that surplus labor has not been discovered by capital. The thirst 
for surplus labor arises from the nature of the production itself Marx states:  
Wherever a part of society possesses the monopoly of the means of production, 
the laborer, free or not free, must add to the working-time necessary for his own 
maintenance an extra working-time in order to produce the means of subsistence 
for the owners of the means of production, whether this proprietor be the 
Athenian χαλός χάγαθός [well-to-do man], Etruscan theocrat, civis Romanus, 
                                                                                                                                            
class of employers of labor have not been the most forward to guard and cherish this treasure” (Marx, 





Norman baron, American slave-owner, Wallachian Boyard, modern landlord or 
capitalist. (Marx, 1972a, p. 235)51 
 
However, within capitalism exploitation takes place without direct coercion and 
takes the form of extraction of surplus value by the capitalist class. And capitalist 
exploitation, production and appropriation of surplus value, according to Marx, occur in 
the process of production.52 
Even though the sphere of circulation, the surface activity on the market and the 
sphere of production make up the totality of capitalist reproduction, Marx draws a clear 
distinction between spheres of exchange and production to go beneath the surface 
appearance of capitalist relations. Perhaps nowhere else is Marx so bitterly ironic as in 
the passage where he lays bare the norms that justify commodity exchange and shows 
freedom and equality are the illusions of the sphere of circulation: 
This sphere [of circulation]… within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of 
labor power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. There 
alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both 
buyer and seller of a commodity… are constrained only by their own free will. 
They contract as free agents… Equality, because each enters into relation with the 
other… and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each 
disposes only of what is his own. And Bentham, because each looks only to 
himself. The only force that brings them together and puts them in relation with 
each other, is the selfishness, the gain and the private interests of each. Each looks 
to himself only, and no one troubles himself about the rest, and just because they 
do so, do they all, in accordance with the pre-established harmony of things, or 
under the auspices of an all-shrewd providence, work together to their mutual 
advantage, for the common weal and in the interest of all. (Marx, 1972a, p. 176) 
  
                                               
51
 The difference between precapitalist and capitalist appropriation of surplus value lies in essentially 
incomparable modes of domination, or to use Marx’s terms, supremacy and subordination. Precapitalist 
relations were based on direct coercion, while capitalism is based on free sale of labor power; free from 
political and religious constraints and subsumed under capital (Marx, 1972a, pp. 235-6). The difference lies 
in the manner by which surplus labor is appropriated: “… the method by which surplus labor is extorted” 
(Marx, 1990, p. 1025). 
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The wage slavery, the inequalities and the class basis of property ownership that 
define the production process are dissolved in the market where buyer and seller confront 
each other as equals. It cannot be realized that the labor must sell his labor power to 
survive, as he has no access to the means of production. 
On the other hand, production relations under capitalism are characterized by the 
exploitation of labor for the sake of extracting surplus value, so the capitalist production 
is an act of hierarchy, subordination and governance.53 The capitalist aspect of production 
requires maximizing the extraction of a surplus value and the production of surplus value 
or the extraction of surplus labor arises from the subordination of labor to capital. That 
makes the governance function despotic and authoritarian because the labor force has to 
create as much surplus value as possible: “the control of the capitalist is in substance 
twofold by reason of the two fold nature of the process of production itself, which, on the 
one hand, is a social process for producing use values, on the other, a process for creating 
surplus value in form that control is despotic” (Marx, 1972a, pp. 331-2). This two-fold 
nature of cooperation, according to Marx, is, on the one hand, a social process for 
producing use values, on the other, a process for creating surplus value. Despotism in 
capitalist production is not intrinsic to the social aspect of production; it is simply 
intrinsic to its capitalist feature which requires surplus value to be maximized and 
imposes therefore, the subjection of labor to capital. The desire to do so is enhanced by 
the laws of competition. 
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 For Marx, capitalist cooperation created a specific need for direction to coordinate individual activities. 
Marx tells us that the capitalist aspect of production requires maximizing the extraction of a surplus value, 
which makes the governance function despotic and authoritarian because the labor force has to create as 
much surplus value as possible (Marx, 1972a, pp. 331-2). The organization of a firm therefore plays a 
fundamental technical function because the many advantages produced by cooperation do not go to the 
benefit of workers. Hence new institutionalist economists Ronald Coase (1910 - …) and Oliver E. 
Williamson (1932 - …) treat the need for governance as a primary raison d’être of firm under capitalist 





The same argument exists in Chapter Twenty One of Capital (1972a) where Marx 
defines “piece wages” as “the most fruitful source of reductions of wages and capitalistic 
cheating [because] they furnish to the capitalist an exact measure for the intensity of 
labor”54 since “the quality of labor is here controlled by the work itself, which must be of 
average perfection if the piece price is to be paid in full … [therefore,] piece wages lay 
the foundation of  … a hierarchically organized system of exploitation and oppression” 
(Marx, 1972a, p. 553). Marx thinks that piece wage is the form of wages most in 
harmony with the capitalist mode of production because it gives the capitalist sufficient 
control over production to draw up standard labor costs and “the exploitation of the 
laborer by capital is here effected through the exploitation of the laborer by laborer” 
(Marx, 1972a, p. 554). Thus, piece wages achieve an increased rate of exploitation via 
increasing intensity of labor while at the same time they remove the difficulties of the 
control by the capitalist over the labor process. Similarly, Braverman argues that piece 
wages are used in modern times “to enlist the worker as a willing accomplice in his or her 
own exploitation … piece rates are combined with the systematic and detailed control on 
the part of management over the process of work” (Braverman, 1998, p. 43). 
Marx says that the production relations under capitalism are characterized by the 
exploitation of labor for the sake of extracting surplus value. Marx’s analysis shows that 
the history of the capitalist mode of production is the history of the appropriation and 
accumulation of surplus value. On the other hand, the production of surplus is only an 
appearance, a semblance. Producers do not stand in any human or social relation to other 
producers, since their “respective products are the means, the mediator, the instrument, 
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the acknowledged power of our mutual needs” (Marx & Engels, 1975, p. 226). Produced 
objects have value, significance, and meaning because they are instruments or means to 
the satisfaction of the desires of both the producers and purchasers. From a selfish and 
egoistic viewpoint, everything and everyone becomes instrumental. “For me, you are 
rather the means and instrument of producing this object that is my aim, just as 
conversely you stand in the same relationship to my object” (Marx & Engels, 1975, p. 
227). 
As seen above, for the capitalist-labor relations, Marx says that the workman has 
no choice but to sell himself to capital on the capitalist’s term. Marx writes: “The Roman 
slave was held by fetters: the wage-laborer is bound to his owner by invisible threads. 
The appearance of independence is kept up by means of a constant change of employers, 
and by the fictio juris of a contract” (Marx, 1972a, p. 574). Marx’s concept of surplus 
labor, applicable to all class societies, is not part of a theory of justice. But, capitalist 
exploitation is a specific form of extraction that involves the transformation of labor 
power into a commodity. Therefore, an accurate interpretation of Marx’s writings on 
exploitation, especially in Capital (1972a), indicates that exploitation, for Marx, is a 
technical process that facilitates capitalists’ ceaseless, unending drive to accumulate 
capital, and is thus, based on capitalists’ control over the labor process.  
By contrast, what Cohen understands from exploitation is totally different as it 
ignores the social relations of capitalism. Therefore, Cohen’s notion of exploitation has 
no connection to capitalist relations of production. Cohen reduces the critique of 
capitalism to a matter of one’s feeling about the fairness or unfairness of the natural and 





Karl Marx on Justice and Morality 
Since Marx writings indicate that his analysis is fundamentally a critique of 
existing conditions, not an attempt to force the world to conform to some predetermined 
ideal, before exploring his critique of capitalism, it is important to discuss Marx’s ideas 
about justice and his moral critique of existing societies. 
First, as Marx’s writings indicate, his works are fundamentally about the existing 
society, rather than some abstract utopia. Marx writes:  
We do not want to dogmatically anticipate the world, but only want to find the 
new world through criticism of the old … constructing the future and settling 
everything for all times are not our affair, it is all the more clear what we have to 
accomplish at present: I am referring to ruthless criticism of all that exists … 
[therefore,] we do not confront the world in a doctrinaire way with a new 
principle: Here is the truth, kneel down before it! We develop new principles for 
the world out of the world’s own principles … We merely show the world what it 
is really fighting for, and consciousness is something that it has to acquire .. The 
reform of consciousness consists only in making the world aware of its own 
consciousness, in awakening it out of its dream about itself, in explaining to it the 
meaning of its own actions. (Marx & Engels, 1975, pp. 142, 144) 
 
The ruthless criticism and the reform of consciousness is not about informing the 
world what rational and just society would be. It is not based on an ethically desirable 
theory of rational choice as in Cohen’s Able & Infirm example; rather, it is about the real 
revolutionary process itself as it unfolds in the real world. Marx argues that there is no 
natural justice, no justice that is permanently valid: 
To speak of natural justice… is nonsense. The justice of the transactions between 
agents of production rests on the fact that these arise as natural consequences out 
of the production relationships. The juristic forms in which these economic 
transactions appears as willful acts of the parties concerned, as expressions of 
their common will and as contracts that may be enforced by law against some 
individual party, cannot, being mere forms, determine this content. They merely 
express it. This content is just whenever it corresponds, is appropriate, to the 
mode of production. It is unjust whenever it contradicts that mode. Slavery on the 






Marx’s interpretation of the concept of justice pays attention to the different 
standards for different historical epochs. For each mode of production there has 
developed different concepts of justice appropriate to it. The following quotation makes 
the point through the satirical lens of irony: “the American constitution, the first to 
recognize the rights of man, in the same breath confirms the slavery of the colored races 
existing in America: [what a contrast, how inconsistent that] class privileges are 
proscribed, race privileges sanctified” (Engels, 1976, p. 134). In the similar sense, in 
ancient times, for instance,55 human sacrifice was common and has been practiced in 
various cultures but now it only means atrocity and savagery; the act is morally 
unjustified. Similarly, for example, in ancient times, since the prevailing system included 
the practice of slavery, slavery was just. But while slavery is not just in the capitalist 
system (except wage slavery), this does not mean that capitalism satisfies any particular 
standard of justice to a higher degree than earlier modes of production. There are merely 
different standards for different historical epochs. 
The main reason why, for Marx and Engels, justice is an ephemeral juridical 
concept, an abstract general standard dependent at any determinate time is because they 
both believe that ideas are the product of the development of social relations of human 
beings and material world reflected by the human mind. And the thought of the 
individual man is the result of “the individual thought of many milliards of past, present 
… man” (Engels, 1976, p. 107). Both Marx and Engels reject ideas, moral norms and 
principles based on transcendental reality. They reject every attempt to impose moral 
dogma because they think they are ahistorical. “Morality, religion… and their 
corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of 
                                               
55





independence. They have no history, no development” (Marx & Engels, 1969b, p. 25). 
They see all moral theories as, Engels writes in Anti-Dühring, as “the product of the 
economic conditions of society obtaining at the time.” Engels continues: 
…as society has hitherto moved in class antagonisms, morality has always been 
class morality; it has either justified the domination and the interests of the ruling 
class, or ever since the oppressed class became powerful enough, it has 
represented its indignation against this domination and the future interests of the 
oppressed. That in this process there has on the whole been progress in morality, 
as in all other branches of human knowledge, no one will doubt. But we have not 
yet passed beyond class morality. A really human morality which stands above 
class antagonisms and above any recollection of them becomes possible only at a 
stage of society which has not only overcome class antagonisms but has even 
forgotten them in practical life. (Engels, 1976, p. 119) 
  
Engels concludes that a really human morality stands above all class antagonisms. 
Therefore, “Law, morality, religion are … so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which 
lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests” (Marx & Engels, 2009, p. 20).  
These quotations explain why Marx and Engels never say that capitalism is unjust 
because it violates the worker’s rights. They do not charge capitalism with being unjust 
because they see the notion of justice as historically determined, a product of a given 
social relations in a particular period in history. That means different types of society are 
characterized by different ethical standards, values, and norms, which change as societies 
with which they are linked evolve. However, this does not mean that Marx does not 
advance normative arguments for criticizing capitalism. Such arguments revolve around 
human autonomy, consciousness, individuality, and sociality. 
As Nicholas Churchich indicates both Marx and Engels share the view that moral 
norms and principles in class society are unavoidably relative. In the class divided 
society, the common interests and moral aspirations are always expressed in terms of 





(Churchich, 1994, p. 15). The demand for justice exists merely as the antithesis of 
injustice, equality as that of inequality. However, to demand equality for justice or 
demand justice for equality as the highest principle and ultimate truth is absurd. This is 
why for Marx and Engels “the real content of proletarian demand for equality is the 
demand for the abolition of classes. Any demand for equality which goes beyond that, of 
necessity passes into absurdity” (Engels, 1976, p. 135). It is obvious that Marx’s 
conception for justice, equality, and freedom is entirely different from liber(al)tarian and 
analytical Marxist conceptions. 
Marx was a sustained critic of moral thinkers such as French anarchist Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) and German socialist-political activist Ferdinand Lassalle 
(1825-1864) who condemned capitalism for being an unjust socioeconomic system.56 For 
Marx, for instance, the interpretation of appropriation of surplus value and property as 
unjust treatment and theft, respectively, implies that they are accidental as if capitalists 
could act differently if they so chose.  
The normative aspect of Marx’s critique of capitalism, argued in the following 
section, sees the nature of commodity production and private property regime as an 
alienating force, one that undermines human autonomy and the ability of self-realization. 
Karl Marx’s Critique of Capitalism and Human Autonomy 
Marx’s theory of human nature and concept of human autonomy occupy an 
important place in both his critique of capitalism and his conception of future society. His 
analysis of alienation and commodity fetishism is a key to understand the capitalist 
society, for it is this analysis which reveals the dehumanizing character of capitalist 
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society. For Marx, human autonomy or human freedom is a capacity of people to 
determine their own actions in a community which is able to provide for the full 
development of human potentiality (Marx & Engels, 1976, p. 78). For Marx, man’s right 
to freedom under capitalism: 
is man’s right to private property… the right of self-interest…It makes every man 
see in other men not the realization of his own freedom, but the barrier to it 
[because] it is not based on the association of man with man but on the separation 
of man from man. It is the right of this separation, the right of the restricted 
individual, withdrawn into himself. The sole bond holding them together is 
natural necessity, need and private interest, the preservation of their property and 
egoistic selves. (Marx & Engels, 1975, pp. 162-4)  
 
Therefore, for Marx, the private property regime is an alienating force as it 
presupposes that the human being is an egoistic monad, seeking his self-interests without 
regard for other men. At an unconscious level, the nature of capitalism encourages 
private interests such as hope of gain and fear of starvation among the members of 
society. Marx’s concern is that man is constrained by his social environment, which 
limits his creative powers and impoverishes him. The totality of man, the unity of 
different aspects, is broken into separate entities under capitalism with the result that man 
is not self-determining but a victim of his circumstances, chained to specialized tasks as 
an isolated, alienated, and egoistical individual. 
Marx’s conception of human nature relates human needs and abilities to self-
realization and free activity, which in turn become the constitutive basis of a harmonious 
community. It is both the foundation of his normative critique of capitalism, and informs 
his conception of the future society. However, this does not mean that Marx’s writings on 
human autonomy and nature are theology or metaphysics. On the contrary, Marx’s 





conditions of life. Also, it is clear that Marx would emphatically deny such an ascription 
to his works. For Marx, human autonomy or freedom,  
… can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally 
regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, 
instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this 
with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favorable to, and 
worthy of, their human nature … The shortening of the working-day is its basic 
prerequisite. (Marx, 1972b, p. 820) 
 
Autonomy or freedom, then, can be best understood as a function of human 
capacity to collectively manipulate the environment in satisfying ways, and as the 
individual capacity to be actively and consciously engaged in coconstructing community 
as a whole. Marx considers human nature, the essence of man as referring to “the 
inherent development potential of every human being when that development proceeded 
in the natural or proper way” (Hunt, 1987, p. 97). The human essence, which is defined in 
terms of human potentiality, is just like the “potential of being a mighty oak is inherent in 
an acorn” (Hunt, 1978, p. 286). If the conditions within which a being actually exists do 
not permit that being to realize its own potential, then the existence of that being 
contradicts the essence of it. The social relations of capitalism do not permit the 
individual to realize his own potential, therefore, the existence of human beings 
contradicts the essence of human being (Hunt, 1987, p. 97). 
E. K. Hunt’s conceptualization of the free development of human potential, which 
considers the different aspects of human beings, is compatible with Carl Gustav Jung 
(1875-1961)57 and Abraham Harold Maslow’s (1908-1970)58 ideas, who theorize about 
human development based on human potentiality and wholeness even though they do not 
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explicitly consider the effect of capitalism as a socioeconomic system on the realization 
of human potential. For example, Jung’s concept of individuation describes the process 
by which man becomes whole by integrating different aspects of his existence through 
self-realization and actualization. He writes: “Individuation means becoming a single, 
homogenous being, and, in so far as ‘in-dividuality’ embraces our innermost, last, and, 
and incomparable uniqueness, it also implies becoming one’s own self. We could 
therefore translate individuation as ‘come to self-hood’ or ‘self-realization’” (Jung, 1963, 
p. 352). Self-actualization involves the development of human potential and is inherent in 
the recognition and integration of other aspects of man just as the potential of being a 
mighty oak is inherent in an acorn. 
Similarly, Maslow’s concept of self-actualized individual is the result of the 
fulfillment of a variety of human needs which are necessary conditions for the 
actualization of human potential (Hunt, 1978, p. 288). Maslow writes that self-
actualization is “the full use and exploitation of talents, capacities, potentialities, and the 
like” (Maslow, 1987, p. 126). Maslow’s theory is based upon a hierarchy of needs in 
which self-actualization involves the higher needs, whose satisfaction opens the door for 
further human development and include as their precondition satisfaction of lower needs, 
i.e., the physiological needs, the safety needs, the belongingness and love needs, and the 
esteem needs (Maslow, 1987, pp. 15-22). Maslow’s concept of a self-actualized 
individual is similar to what Marx refers to when he talks about the “conscious life 
activity” through which human beings are a species being and conscious being, which is 





The uniting element of Marx’s thought with these concepts is the idea that the 
conditions within which man lives under capitalism does not permit him to realize his 
own potential. His alienating existence thwarts his autonomy, preventing the fully 
actualized free development of his potential. 
In a similar vein, Erich Fromm remarks that Marx's concept of future society 
follows from his concept of man. His concept of future society is not a society of 
regimented, automatized individuals, regardless of whether there is equality of income or 
not; it is the emancipation from alienation, the return of man to himself, his self-
realization (Fromm, 1968, p. 5). The concept of the active, productive man who grasps 
and embraces the objective world with his own powers cannot be fully understood 
without envisioning a world free of alienation. Therefore, the opposite of alienation is 
actualization of self-activity and the abolishing of alienation is humanity’s leap from the 
kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom. 
Al Campbell says that it is commonly accepted that both Marx and Engels 
infrequently provide positive descriptions of postcapitalist society but broadly explain the 
“dehumanizing aspects of capitalism in their writings” (Campbell, 2010, p. 270). He also 
emphasizes that Marx’s Vision of a Better Society is deeply seated in his 
conceptualization of the social character of human nature since human beings are always 
and everywhere found in a social life and social interactions. It is also rooted in potential 
human development, which goes along with human nature, as a way of breaking the 
barriers posed to free development of individualities (Campbell, 2010, p. 272-3). 
Therefore, what Marx criticizes is the restriction imposed on potential human 





property regime and its laws of economic competition gives rise to the impoverished, 
atomistic and utilitarian social world of Bentham. As argued above, with the 
subordination of labor to capital under capitalism, labor is separated from its bearer, and 
the human being becomes alienated from his creative powers. In commodified labor, 
Marx refers to separation of man from its bearer, human being, who becomes estranged 
from the product of his labor, from his life activity, from his species being, and from 
other men (Marx, 1986, pp. 112-4). Of the impact of capitalism on individuals, Marx 
writes: 
In estranging from man (1) nature, and (2) himself, his own active functions, his 
life activity, estranged labor estranges the species from man. It changes for him 
the life of the species into a means of individual life. First it estranges the life of 
the species and individual life, and secondly it makes individual life in its abstract 
from the purpose of the life of the species, likewise in its abstract and estranged 
form. (Marx, 1986, p. 112) 
  
In addition, within the universal development of capitalist production and 
exchange, capitalism makes human universality possible while at the same time 
alienating man from this universality:  
The degree and the universality of the development of wealth where this 
individuality becomes possible supposes production on the basis of exchange 
value as a prior condition, whose universality produces not only the alienation of 
the individual from himself and from others, but also the universality and the 
comprehensiveness of his relations and capacities. (Marx, 1993, p. 162) 
  
According to Marx, private property with division of labor is the source of 
alienation. Although private property is not equated with capitalism, alienation as a 
process reaches its peak only in capitalism. The reason for this is that in this system, not 
only does man's own product but also his own labor power, total mental and physical 
abilities characterizing his agency, become a commodity as an independent alien entity. 





a nutshell, Marx’s concept of alienation and fetishism is an argument that, under 
capitalist production the worker becomes the victim of circumstances, turning into an 
isolated and alienated individual by losing control over his life activities and work. As a 
consequence, he becomes estranged from his very human nature, from his free and 
productive activity. The worker ceases to be an autonomous being in any significant 
sense as he is turned into a replaceable thing in the capitalist production apparatus where 
“the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and 
entering into relations both with one another and the human race” (Marx, 1972a, p. 72). 
This is the overlapping element between Polanyi’s (Polanyi, 2001) and Marx’s 
thought. They both criticize that the very attributes of human beings such as autonomy, 
individuality, and sociality, are violated under capitalism. In this regard, the most 
destructive effect of capitalism on human lives is its negation of human autonomy, a fact 
which reaches its peak with the commodification of labor power; capitalism impinges 
upon human autonomy by forcing human beings to act like homo economicus, which in 
turn implies the negation of the essential human being: the individual under capitalism is 
no longer a social being. The most immediate effect of this process is atomization of 
individuals, each of which only behaves in accordance to the profit motive and the fear of 
starvation, irrespective of the other members of the society (Polanyi, 2001, p. 172). This 
process involves the instrumentalization of human beings: economic relations are seen 
not as relations between human beings but as relations between things and forces 
independent of human control. Thus, commodification of the whole-life activity is the 





In his analysis, Marx never says that capitalism is unjust because it violates the 
worker’s rights; instead he focuses on the particular social relations between the worker, 
his product, and his activity that lead to alienation in the labor process. For Marx, the 
labor process “is the instrument of the valorization process, of the process of capital’s self 
valorization – [the process of the creation of surplus value]. The labor process is 
subsumed under capital and the capitalist intervenes in the process as its director, 
manager” (Marx, 1990, p. 1019). This is at the same time directly a process of the 
exploitation of alien labor. Marx calls this “the formal subsumption of labor under capital 
[which] is the general form of every capitalist process of production” (Marx, 1990, p. 
1019). This formal subsumption of labor under capital is a condition and presupposition 
of appropriation and production of relative surplus value, which is regarded as the result 
of the motive behind capital accumulation and also considered a real subsumption of 
labor under capital in a more developed form through the application of social forces of 
production when the capitalist directly takes the control of production. Therefore, the 
labor process comes to be an instrument determined by the process of valorization, the 
production of surplus value which appears as the desired goal. The desire is greatly 
enhanced when the capitalist realizes the laws of competition. The important 
consequence of this process, which is specific to capitalist mode of production, is that 
labor produces the condition for its domination and alienation. Therefore, this process 
takes a form as a means of enslavement of labor. Of the relationship between exploitation 
and alienation, Marx writes: 
The more the worker produces, the less he has to consume; the more values he 
creates the more valueless, the more unworthy he becomes; the better formed his 
product, the more deformed becomes the worker; the more civilized his object, 





more powerless becomes the worker; the more ingenious labor becomes, the less 
ingenious becomes the worker and the more he becomes nature’s bondsman. 
(Marx, 1986, p. 109) 
  
Labor performs miracles for the owners of the means of production but it makes a 
detrimental impact on the life of worker.59 Consequently, the workers relate to the 
product of their labor as to an alien object: “the social character of his labor confronts the 
worker as something not merely alien, but hostile and antagonistic, when it appears 
before him objectified and personified in capital” (Marx, 1990, p. 1025). And the primary 
consequence of alienated labor is fetishism. Marx’s analysis not only points to this, but 
also explains it as the mystified self power of capital with origins of the commodity form 
of capitalist relations and the ultimate origin of fetishistic appearance of social reality in 
capitalism. As Marx states it: 
The objective conditions essential to the realization of labor are alienated from the 
worker and become manifest as fetishes endowed with a will and soul of their 
own. Commodities, in short appear as the purchasers of persons. The buyer of 
labor power is nothing but the personification of objectified labor cedes a part of 
itself to the worker in the form of means of subsistence in order to annex the 
living labor power for the benefit of the remaining portion, so as to keep itself and 
even to grow beyond its original size by virtue of this annexation. It is not the 
worker who buys the means of production and subsistence, but the means of 
production that buy the worker to incorporate him into the means of production. 
(Marx, 1990, pp. 1004-5) 
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 This point in turn provides another basis for complete alienation of the worker from the contribution of 
his labor, which is reduced to a nonentity because history gives no place to the real achievements of 
history, to the contribution made by laboring classes. An insightful and poetic explanation of this 
alienation, alienation of consciousness, can be found in the lines of the great German poet Bertolt Brecht’s 
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Hence, the wage and labor relationship is turned upside-down, so that “the 
products of laborers turned into independent powers, products as rulers and buyers of 
their producers … confront the laborer as properties of their products” (Marx, 1972b, p. 
815). And the realization of labor is not the point of dealing with criticism of the wealth 
transfer in Marx’s lines, but “loss of realization for the workers; objectification as loss of 
the object and bondage to it; appropriation as estrangement, as alienation. So much does 
labor’s realization appear as loss of realization that the worker loses realization to the 
point of starving to death” (Marx, 1986, p. 108). Man, hereby, is motivated by hope of 
gain and fear of hunger and behaves in accordance to the profit motive and the fear of 
starvation and is coercively prevented from having a free life producing “in accordance 
with the laws of beauty” (Marx, 1986, p. 114). 
In Marx’s works, the question of reduction of labor to a means to life, which 
undermines human autonomy, is the basis of his critique of capitalism. Marx 
demonstrates that human social activity becomes “a material thing outside man” having 
an “estranged, alienating and self-disposing species nature” (Marx, 1986, p. 168). This 
shows that a dimension of human activity outside the realm of production, a dimension of 
labor, as human beings exist. The analysis of dimensions of labor as human being is 
grounded in a theoretical level. Therefore, Marx’s analysis of the labor process in 
capitalism is a conceptualization of the alienation of labor with all the various 
components, the mystifying and dominating aspects of alienation. And his theory is a 
historical explanation of the appearance of labor as a commodity and all the implications 
that this appearance has for social theory. Marx’s vision of labor emancipated from the 





attempts to capture these implications in the economic concepts he elaborates as the labor 
theory of value. Because Marx’s theory operates on both the historical and theoretical 
level, and with an appearance and reality distinction, it can hardly be correct Cohen’s 
claim that Marx treats labor as an ideological instrument. Cohen’s failure is not to 
recognize the wholeness of Marx’s analysis of capitalism and connectedness of his 
thoughts. 
For Marx, because of the reason stated above, the capitalist mode of production is 
not compatible with the individual’s autonomy: the right of self-realization, self-
actualization, and self-determination underlie together. Marx finds capitalism in his 
analysis as a barrier standing in the way of human freedom and autonomy, a barrier to 
human emancipation. 
Concluding Remarks 
Insofar as production involves the appropriation and transformation of nature, it is 
organized around some type of property relations which have existed in all societies and 
in all historical epochs. What interests Marx is the question of what features are peculiar 
and specific to capitalism. For Marx, the legal foundation of capital is the law of private 
property as it exists in the capitalist mode of production. The laws of private property and 
the order of the capitalist mode of production and circulation, which both perpetuated 
ruling class’ power, are the mechanism, by which the ruling class coercively expropriates 
the economic surplus created by the working class who is separated from all means of 
production. So, that is sufficient for capitalism to start moving according to its own laws 
of motion, ceaseless, unending drive to accumulate capital (Hunt, 2002, pp. 233-4). For 





become a source of dehumanization; it undermines human autonomy on the basis of 
alienation and the fetish character of commodity production which represents the 
commodification of life itself. 
This historical process signifies the separation of human beings from their natural 
surroundings, from each other and even from their own capacities and power (Marx, 
1986, pp. 112-4). Hence, the abolition of private property is Marx’s solution, the route to 
human emancipation, and return of man to himself for totality of human being as a social 
total being. Thus Engels writes: “The slave frees himself by rupturing of all private 
property relations only the relation of slavery, and thereby becomes himself a proletarian; 
the proletarian can free himself only by abolishing private property in general” (Marx & 
Engels, 1969b, p. 84). It gives the people the freedom that the bourgeois private property 
regime denies them. The following quotation lays bare that Marx’s concept of human 
autonomy is anything more than a critique of tyranny and oppression. Neither Nozick’s 
liber(al)tarian-ism nor Cohen’s analytical Marxism can see society as the realization of 
human autonomy. The problem with these narrow notions of freedom is that they wind 
up condoning the violation of broad notions of freedom. In the Manuscripts of 1846, 
Marx writes of: 
Communism as the positive transcendence of private property as human self-
estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and 
for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a 
social being – a return accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth 
of previous development. This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equal 
humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine 
resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man – the 
true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between 
objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the 






For Marx, such a community would be the actualization of real human autonomy, 
human freedom. It is clear that the narrow notions of human autonomy presented in Able 
& Infirm examples of cleanly generated two male persons society, in which Able and 
Infirm make a tradeoff between autonomy and equality and production does take place 
not as a social relation and process,60 does not have any affinity with Marx’s concept of 
human autonomy. 
Cohen’s analytical analysis is problematical because it is based on a hypothetical 
model defined in terms of individuals’ beliefs, attitudes, and purposes as they are 
themselves matters to be explained. Marx stresses that the analysis of society must start 
from the structure of social relations, not from individual motivations or choices. The 
isolated individual of Cohen’s model is open to criticism since, as Marx indicates:  
The point is rather that private interest is itself already a socially determined 
interest, which can be achieved only within the conditions laid down by society 
and with the means provided by society; hence it is bound to the reproduction of 
these conditions and means. It is the interest of private persons; but its content, as 
well as the form and means of its realization, is given by social conditions 
independent of all. (Marx, 1993, p. 156)  
 
For Marx, “Man is no abstract being, squatting outside the world” (Marx, 1968, p. 
11-2) but “the social being” and whose life “is therefore an expression and confirmation 
of social life” (Marx, 1986, p. 138) and production (the activity of human beings 
modifying the natural environment in order to meet their needs) is always social. 
Production, as a social process, involves relations between individuals. In the social 
production of their existence, human beings “inevitably enter into definite relations, 
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which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given 
stage in the development of their material forces of production” (Marx, 1970, p. 20). 
These relations are a product of a long process of historical evolution, and as such are not 
the result of deliberate choice floated along a logical positivism. 
In a similar vein, Veblen writes of “the accumulated, habitual knowledge of the 
ways and means involved in the production and use of these appliances is the outcome of 
long experience and experimentation” (Veblen, 1908, p. 153). Veblen indicates that 
production is always a social and cultural phenomenon in which output could never be 
said to be purely the result of any person or factor of production as opposed to Cohen’s 
abstract individualist model. Production is a social process in which individuals share 
knowledge and skills, have passed them on from generation to generation, and have 
cooperated socially in a process of transforming nature to suit human needs and uses 
(Hunt, 2002, p. 322). 
Cohen, thus, dissects society into its simplest elements, and discovers in doing so 
that the simplest society consists of at least two people. However, he does not question 
that these two people may be morally or intellectually unequal. This simple fact leads to 
the idea the simplest elements of society are not two men, but a woman and a man, who 
found a family, the simplest and first form of association for the purpose of production 
(Engels, 1976, p. 122). But this cannot in any way suit Cohen because the founders of 
society must come to appreciate that equality for an egalitarian society is the sole intrinsic 
value. 
On the other hand, as Engels states, a two men world is doomed beforehand to 





world since women are not considered and the equality of people is at most the equality 
of heads of families (Engels, 1976, p. 122). This means Cohen’s two person society is 
characterized by male domination and female subordination. Therefore, the equality in a 
two person world is not only an unquestioned and unproven theological axiom but is even 
a great unpardonable exaggeration. Cohen’s demand for egalitarian society in material 
terms, which is of course primeval, is no different than the bourgeois demand for equality 
or promoting equality. 
In reality, the demand for equality has been “the spontaneous reaction against the 
crying social inequalities, against the contrast between rich and poor, the feudal lords and 
their serfs, the surfeiters and the starving” (Engels, 1976, p. 135). However, “the real 
content of proletarian demand for equality is the demand for the abolition of classes. Any 
demand for equality which goes beyond that, of necessity passes into absurdity” (Engels, 
1976, p. 135). Cohen’s famous logically positivist abstract two man world model is able 
to conduct their economic relations on the basis of equality because this seems quite 
natural to popular egalitarian analytic prejudice. And Cohen does not want to call his 
abstract, self-interested, and alienated individual to abolish classes for equality in order 
keep his analysis in a rigorous and scientific shell after he faced the disappointing results 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
In addition, Cohen’s discussion of the tradeoff between equality and freedom 
cannot go beyond a fruitless and superficial analysis. Freedom or autonomy does not 
consist in any dreamt of independence based on veto power on an abstract model, but 
“command over ourselves and over external nature, a command founded on knowledge 





(Engels, 1976, p. 144). Freedom does mean neither to make egalitarian, nor rational, nor 
arbitrary choices among many different and conflicting possible decisions on 
presupposed grounds that equality is to be reckoned an intrinsically desirable good. Only 
within abolishing “class distinctions or anxiety over the means of subsistence for the 
individual and in which for the first time there can be talk of real human freedom” 
(Engels, 1976, p. 145). As a result, Cohen’s view is only a form of ethical individualism, 
a quite particular individualistic formulation of the question of economic justice, as it is a 
far cry from Marxism. 
Additionally, Cohen’s contention that Marx’s socialist proportionality principle is 
a right of inequality is questionable. Firstly, as discussed and shown by the following 
quotation, Marxism is fundamentally a critique of existing conditions, not an attempt to 
force the world to conform to some predetermined ideal: “Communism is for us not a 
state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality have to adjust itself. 
We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The 
conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence” (Marx & Engels, 
1969b, p. 38). Also, what is the most misunderstood concept is that every single thing in 
bourgeois society, or in any society, cannot be abolished overnight. The development of 
rights under socialism in Marx’s own words is as follows: 
One man is superior to another physically to another, mentally, and so supplies 
more labor in the same time, or can labor for a longer time; and labor, to serve as 
a measure, must be defined by its duration or intensity, otherwise it ceases to be a 
standard of measurement. This equal right is an unequal right for unequal labor. It 
recognizes no class differences, because everyone is only a worker like everyone 
else; but it tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowment, and thus productive 
capacity, as a natural privilege. … Thus, with an equal output, and hence an equal 
in the social consumption fund, one will in fact receive more than another, one 
will be richer than another, and so on. To avoid all these defects, right, instead of 






Here Marx, as a depth realist, sketches the development of rights under socialism 
and takes into account the necessity of conversion of the means of production into the 
common property of the whole society even though it does not remove the defects. 
Continuing, Marx says: “these defects are inevitable in the first phase of communist 
society as it is when it has just emerged after “prolonged birth pangs from capitalist 
society.” Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and the 
cultural development thereby determined” (Marx & Engels, 1936, p. 565). Before Marx 
comes to his famous saying, he again talks about the development of productive force as 
a natural necessity to abolish alienation, to emancipate labor, and to eliminate “the 
antithesis between mental and physical labor” (Marx & Engels, 1936, p. 566). Also, more 
importantly, if abundance will be at stake, it is an indubitable fact that the material 
success of the future society will not be “due to the willing, indeed the enthusiastic, 
subordination of man to the needs of the machine” as it has been in capitalism (Polanyi, 
1947, p. 109). Since capitalism is a barrier to real human autonomy, and “responsible for 
the splitting up of man’s vital unity into real man, bent on material values, and his ‘ideal’ 
better self,” and human beings are squeezed by the motives of hunger and gain, the 
payoff matrix resulting from historical development of capitalism demands responsibility 
of humanity for “the vital task of restoring the fullness of life to the person, even though 
this may mean a technologically less efficient society” (Polanyi, 1947, pp. 112, 116). 
When the all narrow and inhumane horizons of class-divided societies are left 
behind, as V. Adoratsky writes down a note that, people will have become accustomed to 
being a part of social life in where voluntary work takes place according to every 





products to distribute them to each member of the society; “each will take freely 
according to his needs” (Marx, 1936, pp. 566-7). 
After exploring Marx’s analysis and critique of capitalism, it becomes clear that 
Cohen’s approach takes Marx’s analysis and critique of capitalism as an underpayment 
account and a requiem for a soft hearted capitalist. It is also clear that Cohen’s arguments 
for his critique of Marx’s concept of exploitation relies heavily on a very literalistic 
reading of theft and steal in some of Marx’s writings; rather, consistently relies on French 
anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865), who sloganeered “Property is theft” in 
his 1840 book What is Property.61 When Cohen uses the quotations from Marx’s works, 
what he misses out is that Marx talks about the contradiction between the foundation of 
bourgeois production and its development and says that the exploitative nature of 
capitalist production as the source of the wealth is the fundamental underpinning of the 
alienation under capitalism. In concerned works, the capitalist is not a theft in a material 
sense; theft and steal are used metaphorically to allege wrongdoing because he is a theft 
on the basis of the dehumanization process of capitalism. According to him, exploitation 
as a “formal subsumption of labor under capital” is the inevitable result of the capitalist 
mode of production as a mechanism of satisfying capital’s needs for surplus value. Also, 
it represents the particular social relations of capitalism that give to capital and capitalists 
control of all labor process. It is clear that Marx’s theory is not a wholly exploitation 
centered critique of capitalism which lacks a proper understanding of the historical 
features of capitalism. Indeed, the reason Marx holds, his ruthless criticism of capitalism 
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 Proudhon defines property 60 times as a robbery in his book What is Property (Proudhon, 1970). Marx 
responds to Proudhon’s expression “property is theft” in the letter to J. B. Scweitzer On Proudhon writing: 
“… since ‘theft’ as a forciable violation of property presupposes property, Proudhon entangled himself in 
all sorts of figments of the imagination, obscure even to himself, about true bourgeois property” (Marx & 





for the reform of consciousness of man as an active agent of history is that capitalism 
undermines human autonomy. In the lines of Marx, capitalism is a barrier to human 
autonomy and capitalists are the ones who steal the opportunities of “free development of 
individualities” (Marx, 1993, pp. 704-6). Marx’s detailed examination of the features of 
the capitalist mode of production facilitates a better understanding of the impact of 
capitalism on human autonomy. It uncovers the underlying fact that the impact results in 
alienation of the individual from himself, others, and nature, thereby, thwarting his 
attempts at self-realization and self-actualization and attainment of the ultimate form of 
humanness. For Marx, human autonomy within the unity of human sociality and 
individuality is broken down in capitalism. Since labor power, the total mental and 
physical abilities and capacities of a human being, becomes a commodity in capitalism, 
the notions of alienation and fetishism are essential in demonstrating the dehumanizing 
























Concluding Overview of The Chapters of The Thesis 
This thesis has examined the writings of Nozick, Cohen, and Marx to resolve the 
controversy surrounding the concepts of exploitation, equality, human autonomy, and 
justice under capitalism. In general, an effort is made to sort out the conceptualization of 
capitalism, exploitation, equality, human autonomy, consciousness, self-realization, self-
actualization, and justice. 
For this purpose, this study has tried to critically reflect on Nozick’s moral and 
political theory, drawing attention to the foundation and formation of his theory of justice 
which makes capitalism the most free and just society. As argued, Nozick’s libertarian 
philosophy misuses the concept of freedom. He sees freedom as intrinsic to capitalism, 
but he does not give proper notice to the constraints which necessarily accompany it. To 
think of capitalism as a realm of freedom is to overlook the nature of capitalism. It is not 
an aim of this study to be The Last Supper of liber(al)tarian philosophical diaspora, but it 
has tried to contribute modestly to the critique of this canon. Therefore, this study means 
that it is inaccurate to treat libertarianism as a philosophical theory for which good and 
consistent arguments, with fell founded premises, can be produced. More specifically, 
Cohen’s claims that there are close affinities between libertarianism and Marxism, 





The early bourgeois liberal writings on self-ownership were a historically 
progressive weapon against the noncontractual claims of feudal lords on the labor of their 
serfs. Now, libertarianism takes it as purely reactionary and conservative argument 
against the welfare state, specifically state intervention in the free market economy. 
Contrary to liber(al)tarian arguments, self-ownership cannot protect freedom, it violates 
freedom. Therefore, Cohen is right when he concludes that self-ownership cannot be 
compatible with equality and autonomy; it is only a way of justifying capitalist inequality 
in libertarianism. Nozick’s philosophy clearly equates human personality with private 
property. He uses the concept of self-ownership to idolize the private property regime to 
justify excessive egoism and pure selfishness, and to reproduce an abstract and happy 
form of capitalism. His masterpiece Anarchy, State, and Utopia is like Mona Lisa’s face: 
for libertarians she is smiling, from a critical point of view she is very sad. His theory 
fails to represent itself as an ideal of freedom, equality, and justice in any significant 
sense. Nozick’s concept of justice is nothing more than a form of secularization of 
medieval theological notions. In short, libertarianism appears to be trapped by being 
between Scylla and Charybdis because of its ideological incoherence to justify private 
ownership and slavery in capitalism under the name of a theory of justice. 
It is not reasonable to link the libertarian idea of self-ownership to Marx’s concept 
of exploitation. The usage of the term exploitation in Marx’s writings does not 
necessarily require the further conclusion that capitalism is an unjust socioeconomic 
system that violates the worker’s rights. Therefore, it is not reasonable to claim that Marx 
criticizes or blames the wealth transfer from worker to capitalist for income inequalities 





and detailed analysis of commodity production under capitalism to comprehend the 
characteristics of capitalist production and the social character of man’s own labor which 
is the source of the mystery. Also, as seen on the critique of Nozick, Marx was familiar 
with the idea of self-ownership and was an outspoken critic of it. For example, Max 
Stirner (1806-56), a leading exponent of individualism and the originator of the idea of 
self-ownership, is sharply criticized by Marx, in German Ideology to which a large and 
significant part was devoted (Hook, 1936, p.165).62 According to Marx and Engels, the 
understanding of individuality as self-ownership could not convey essential human reality 
but only illusionary forms of flawed bourgeois reality.63 
Cohen’s contention is that the Marxist theory of exploitation rests on the notion of 
self-ownership, which should be questioned because it violates equality and human 
autonomy. But, such a conception of exploitation is entirely unrelated to Marx’s analysis 
and critique of capitalism. Cohen contends that Marxists’ deepest beliefs require that they 
should distance themselves from libertarianism with its thesis of self-ownership, and that 
they should embrace an anti-self-ownership view, a more egalitarian view, since he 
believes that no theory of freedom can offer a complete picture of just society as 
illustrated in the Able & Infirm example, but only a theory of distributive justice can do 
so. 
The main tenets of Cohen’s positivist and ethical claims are as follows: Cohen 
argues that capitalism is condemned by Marx on moral grounds, and that capitalism is an 
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bourgeois stupidity since it is merely a religious solemn parody of Jeremy Bentham’s (1748-1832) 





unjust social system because exploitation is a form of injustice. The strong merit of 
Cohen’s view is that it can provide a way to see Marx’s distinction between the different 
perspectives from which capitalism can be judged. There is the bourgeois perspective 
from which capitalism appears to be a moral and just social system, one which allows for 
individual freedom, self-actualization, and equality. This perspective is one which 
focuses on the appearances of the market exchanges, and that is incompatible with the 
reality of capitalism within the sphere of production. 
There are at least four difficulties with Cohen’s positivist egalitarian position. 
First, Cohen’s interpretation of exploitation is not compatible with that of Marx. As seen 
in structuring Marx’s theoretical analysis of creation and appropriation of surplus value, 
his actual view on exploitation is that he considers it as a formal and technical process 
and the particular social relations of capitalism that give to capital and capitalists control 
of all labor process. According to Marx, exploitation, which is intrinsic to the mode of 
production and a specific form of extraction that includes viewing labor power as a 
commodity, is the practice which enables capitalism to exist and continue as a social 
practice. An accurate interpretation of Marx indicates that his analysis and critique of 
capitalism is not an exploitation centered critique of capitalism, or underpayment 
account. Indeed, an exploitation centered critique of capitalism in terms of distributive 
social justice lacks a proper understanding of the features of capitalism by presupposing 
capitalists could act differently. Such a moral critique of the bourgeois property regime 
answers nothing. 
Second, Cohen’s approach fails to articulate important connections between 





exploitation are internally related, so that eliminating one requires eliminating the other. 
The third defect in Cohen’s analytical analysis is that it involves a “commitment to highly 
questionable, reductionist and/or metaphysically inflected version of MI [methodological 
individualism]” (Kumar, 2008, p. 191). This study has argued that an abstract 
individualism is shared by both Nozick and Cohen on their discussions of capitalism and 
justice. Cohen’s technique of logical and linguistic analysis is based on a reductionist 
methodological individualism and his concept is an individualistic formulation of the 
question of economic justice. Also, Cohen, like other analytical Marxists, considers 
exploitation only in isolated individual activities without analyzing them in their social 
context. Cohen’s views appear to be merely the most egalitarian wing of the liberal 
economic theory. His assessment of justice reduces the critique of capitalism to a matter 
of a hypothetically created individual’s feelings about the fairness or unfairness of 
income distribution as a result of the distribution of initial natural talents, advantages, etc. 
The last one, the primary inadequacy, is that Cohen fails to offer a complete 
explanation and a proper treatment of human autonomy which is undermined by the 
existing society. Marx believes and argues that capitalism is an obstacle to human 
autonomy on the way of free and full development of each individual. Therefore, given 
other interpretations of Marx’s views which do not ascribe to such claims, and given that 
these interpretations are more accurate, it is reasonable to reject this linguistically ethical 
version as an implausible explanation of Marx’s views. 
As argued, Marx’s critique of capitalism is based on his concept of human 
autonomy, human nature, and his theory of alienation. The importance of human nature 





abolition of private property regime through it, but also conceives how the world ought to 
be according to it. For Marx, capitalism prevents the full realization of freedom and is a 
barrier to free human development and human autonomy, and therefore, the freedom 
provided to the individual by the social system should be increased for free development 
of individualities in a society in which the behavior of the individual is not conducted on 
the basis of the motives: fear of starvation and hope of gain. The criteria for this 
judgment are based on a scientific examination of the existing system of capitalist 
production. Human autonomy and freedom refer to a life of self-realization, self-
actualization and determination in a harmonious community in which private property 
regime is abolished. This life reflects the realization of what Marx conceives as “truly 
human,” in other words, the realization of human essence that is strengthened by real 
human autonomy which is the underlying principle for human consciousness, 
individuality, sociality, self-realization, and actualization. 
Finally, and naturally enough, to give a picture of real human autonomy and to 
share a hope it would not be unrealistic to say that men would find themselves telling a 
fairytale with a happy ending when they are asked what the world was like. The world 
they describe would seem as strange and unbelievable to them as the Ancient World does 
to today. And they would find themselves saying: “You are not going to believe this, but 
once…” while the men would “hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in 
the evening, criticize after dinner” just as having a mind and “without ever becoming 






This study would be significantly strengthened by involving a large number of 
perceptions about the conscious and unconscious impact of capitalism on autonomy, self-
realization and actualization of the individual. If a study brings the common elements of 
the works of K. Marx, K. Polanyi and A. Gramsci with the views of analytical and 
transpersonal psychologists, such as C. Jung, A. Maslow, etc. by focusing upon 
suggestive parallels on the totality of man as an active agent of history and connection 
between autonomy, fetishism, and alienation, such a work could provide a more robust 
assessment of the impact of capitalism as socioeconomic system on the individual, 
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